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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Ashcroft v. ACLU,1 the Supreme Court ruled on Congress’s second 
attempt to regulate minors’ access to harmful material on the Internet.  
Congress’s first attempt, the Communications Decency Act of 1996, was 
struck down in Reno v. ACLU.2  In response to this ruling, Congress 
enacted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which tried to address 
the concerns articulated in Reno by forcing commercial vendors of 
pornographic Internet material to require a credit card for access to their 
sites.3  Nonetheless, the Ashcroft Court still found the COPA 
unconstitutional, on the grounds that it “was likely to burden some 
speech that is protected for adults” and that there were “plausible, less 
restrictive alternatives . . . .”4  One such alternative, the Court speculated, 
would be for Congress to encourage the use of Internet filtering software 
that would screen out whatever material parents did not want their 
children accessing.5  This filtering software would permit adults to gain 
access to speech otherwise deemed harmful to minors “without having to 
identify themselves or provide their credit card information.”6
Justice Breyer’s dissent took a less stringent, one-sided view of the 
burdens issue.  According to Justice Breyer, the regulations imposed 
only a “modest additional burden on adult access to legally obscene 
material . . . .”7  Furthermore, in the dissent’s view, filtering software did 
not amount to a viable “less restrictive alternative.”8  First, because such 
software currently exists, it is part of the status quo that Congress sought 
to change—a status quo in which children were gaining significant 
 1. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004). 
 2. 521 U.S. 844, 849, 885 (1997) (holding the Communications Decency Act 
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest and because less restrictive alternatives were available). 
 3. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).  The Communications Decency Act imposed criminal 
penalties for the knowing posting, for “commercial purposes,” of internet content that is 
“harmful to minors.”  Id. §231(a).  However, the Act provided an affirmative defense to 
commercial vendors who restricted access to prohibited materials by “requiring use of a 
credit card” or “any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology.”  Id. § 231(c)(1); see Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 
223 (2000); Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2789. 
 4. 124 S. Ct. at 2791. 
 5. Id. at 2792–93. 
 6. Id. at 2792.  The Court ruled that the government had “failed to carry its 
burden” of proving that existing technologies were less effective than the restrictions in 
COPA.  Id. at 2793.  “The Government’s burden is not merely to show that a proposed 
less restrictive alternative has some flaws; its burden is to show that it is less effective.”  
Id. 
 7. Id. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 2801–04. 
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access to “harmful material” on the internet.9  Second, there was strong 
evidence that filtering software was not effective in blocking out 
undesirable material.10  Third, filtering software is expensive and hence 
not universally available.11  Fourth, children could still gain access to 
harmful Internet material from computers at the homes of friends.12  
Consequently, as Justice Breyer noted, “a ‘filtering software status quo’ 
means filtering that underblocks, imposes a cost upon each family that 
uses it, fails to screen outside the home, and lacks precision.”13
The dissent emphasized the unique characteristics of the Internet, with 
its overwhelming supply of pornographic material accessible to children, 
but the majority relied upon the same old First Amendment doctrines 
that had been developed during an era of street-corner political 
protestors.  Formulated in a time when speech was nowhere near as 
abundant or intrusive as it is now, the marketplace model seeks to 
maximize the amount of speech in the social communications system by 
eliminating any and all burdens on speaker freedoms.  This one-sided 
focus, however, has become outmoded and even counterproductive in a 
time of media proliferation.  It ignores the rights of people trying to 
avoid the flood of offensive and destructive speech. 
II.  THE MARKETPLACE MODEL 
With enough quantity of speech, so the marketplace model holds, 
quality will naturally occur.  In theory, limitless quantity creates a 
situation, much like the Adam Smith economy, of perfect competition 
among ideas.  This competition, again like Adam Smith’s economic 
model, will ideally lead to truth, which in turn will lead to rational and 
enlightened self-government.  No concern is put on the content or 
character of the speech involved, because such determinations are left up 
to the market. 
Incorporated within this scheme is the notion that “good” speech will 
overcome “bad,” and that “truth” will then win out.14  The model even 
welcomes the entrance of so-called bad ideas, because only by 
competing against such ideas are the worthiness of good ideas 
 9. Id. at 2801–02. 
 10. Id. at 2802. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 2803. 
 14. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245–50 (1936). 




established.  Consequently, even the most innocuous of regulations, if 
they create distinctions or burdens based on content, will likely be struck 
down.15  In the political speech arena, at least up until McConnell v. 
FEC,16 the Court has repeatedly focused on quantity rather than quality, 
and has overturned laws that in any way decrease the amount of speech 
existing in the electoral process.17
Over the years, the marketplace model has proved to be the dominant 
one employed in the Court’s free speech jurisprudence—the model most 
used to decide First Amendment controversies.18  According to one legal 
scholar, the marketplace model “has dominated recent First Amendment 
discourse . . . .”19  Therefore, when the interests of willing or potentially 
willing listeners conflict with the interests of unwilling listeners, the 
former will almost always prevail in any constitutional analysis, no 
matter how few in number the willing listeners may be as compared to 
the unwilling.20
Under the marketplace model, indecent and violent speech is protected 
as soundly as are political editorials: In Sable Communications v. FCC,21 
the Court overturned a prohibition on dial-a-porn messages.  In United 
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,22 it ruled unconstitutional a 
regulation that would force the Playboy Channel to show its sexually 
explicit programming only during late-night hours.  And in Reno v. 
ACLU,23 it used the marketplace model to give the highest level of 
constitutional protections to the Internet, no matter how much violent 
and pornographic and hate speech is found on that medium. 
 15. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418–28 (1993) 
(finding a municipal regulation’s distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
publications to be content-based and therefore invalid); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231, 233 (1987) (striking down tax applicable to general interest 
magazines, but not newspapers or specialinterest magazines). 
 16. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 17. Brian K. Pinaire, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: The 
Supreme Court and Political Speech in the Electoral Process, 17 J.L. & POL. 489, 503 
(2001). 
 18. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853, 866 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 
(1981); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 
382 (1967). 
 19. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, The New 
Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 160–61 (1995). 
 20. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (“[T]he 
Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected 
speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.”). 
 21. 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989). 
 22. 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000). 
 23. 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997) (deciding that the Internet was to be governed, in 
a First Amendment sense, by the highly protective print standard rather than the less 
protective broadcast standard). 
GARRY 4/14/2005  1:15 PM 
[VOL. 42:  129, 2005]  The Right to Reject 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 133 
 
III.  A HISTORY OF THE MARKETPLACE MODEL 
The marketplace of ideas metaphor was first expressed by Justice 
Holmes in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States.24  This view of 
free speech—that an open marketplace of many competing ideas will 
lead to the discovery of truth25—had already been outlined in the early 
theories of John Milton and John Stuart Mill.26  But the real accomplishment 
of Holmes was to elevate free speech above that of merely an individual 
interest, which was unlikely to prevail when balanced against important 
social interests. 
Dissenting in Abrams, Holmes borrowed from the free speech theory 
of Zechariah Chafee: “that the true meaning of freedom of speech lie in 
its contribution to democratic society.”27  According to Chafee, “the discovery 
and spread of truth on subjects of general concern constituted one of the 
most important purposes of society and government; and such discovery 
was only possible through free and unlimited discussion.”28  This theory 
gave Holmes a “greater rationale—a democratic argument—for protecting 
speech.”29  “No longer should speech be protected only because individuals 
should be free to say and do whatever they liked, free speech should be 
protected because it was necessary for the survival of democracy.”30  For 
this reason, free speech could then weigh more heavily on the judicial 
balance with other social interests such as national security.31
In Abrams, the Court upheld the Sedition Act convictions of individuals 
charged with distributing pamphlets attacking the government’s expeditionary 
force to Russia and calling for a general strike.32  Holmes dissented with 
his now famous marketplace of ideas metaphor: “the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
 24. 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. 
 26. JOHN MILTON, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the 
Parliament of England, in AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER PROSE WRITINGS 3, 23–28, 48–49 
(William Haller ed., The Macmillan Co. 1927) (1644); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 
75–118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859). 
 27. Patrick Garry, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Democratic Foundations of the 
First Amendment, in GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 125, 135–36 
(William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993). 
 28. Id. at 135. 
 29. Id. at 136. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 250 U.S. 616, 616–20, 624. 




market . . . .”33  This theory advanced not only an individual liberty argument, 
but the notion that dissenting speech served important governmental 
interests, as the truthful basis of a government action could only be 
tested in the marketplace of ideas. 
Holmes’s marketplace theory was to exert a profound impact on First 
Amendment law.  Court decisions in the latter part of the twentieth century 
would generally adopt the view of the First Amendment as set forth in 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent.34  Yet even though the marketplace model 
provided a substantial influence in the development of First Amendment 
doctrine, its role has changed in recent decades, especially as the majority of 
speech cases came to involve sexually explicit forms of entertainment 
rather than more traditional forms of political dissent.35  Whereas the 
model used to rely, ultimately, on the quality of speech—namely, the 
achievement of truth—now it looks only to the quantity of speech, with 
little pretext at serving any larger cause.  Now the marketplace model is 
not so much a rationale for protecting speech as it is a simple 
descriptor—that the law now protects as much speech as can be 
crammed into the media marketplace.  But despite these changes in its 
role, the marketplace model, ever since Holmes’s articulation of it in 
1919, believes in maximizing the amount of speech in the system.36  The 
issue some eight decades later is whether, given the changed circumstances 
of America’s media age, a different view of the First Amendment is 
needed for the survival of a culture on which self-government depends. 
A host of “changed circumstances” have eroded many of the 
underlying conditions of the marketplace metaphor.  In general, the 
“speakers” in the contemporary marketplace of ideas are media 
conglomerates, selling their entertainment programming to a relatively 
passive public.  Those conglomerates tend to see the public as a mere 
commodity, an audience to be delivered up to advertisers.37  And to 
 33. Id. at 630. 
 34. Garry, supra note 27, at 139. 
 35. See, e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (addressing 
congressional regulations of adult programming on cable television); Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (involving a congressional act regulating indecent messages on the 
Internet); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (involving the constitutionality of a 
statute expansively defining child pornography); Sable Comms. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 
(1989) (ruling on statutory ban on indecent telephone messages); Hustler Magazine, Inc. 
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (involving a lewd and sexually explicit parody); City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (addressing zoning ordinance 
governing the location of adult motion picture theaters); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747 (1982) (ruling on the constitutionality of a statute regulating the promotion of sexual 
performances by minors). 
 36. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 37. See Ronald W. Adelman, The First Amendment and the Metaphor of Free 
Trade, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1125, 1166 (1996). 
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attract as large an audience as possible, the media designs entertainment 
programming that is aimed at the lowest common denominator.38
In the world of Holmes’s marketplace of ideas, no individual speaker 
played a dominant role.  An equality of power existed among all potential 
speakers, and listeners could freely choose when to participate in the 
communications marketplace and when to remove themselves from it.39  
Because they could access this marketplace only one way, by going out 
into the public square and listening to it, they had greater control over 
the intrusion of public speech into their lives.  But none of these conditions 
seem to exist today, in a communications marketplace dominated by the 
entertainment industry. 
The one accomplishment of which the marketplace model can certainly 
boast is that of increasing the sheer volume of speech.  The number of 
over-the-air television stations that the average U.S. household can 
receive has more than tripled over the last twenty years.40  Moreover, 
cable television and direct broadcast satellite systems, which are now 
almost universally available, can provide hundreds of additional channels.  
Then there are personal video recorders and wireless local area networks 
and other emerging spread-spectrum technologies, as well as packet-
switched networks, all of which will further increase the sources of 
speech.  The FCC acknowledged this explosion in information sources as 
far back as 1987 when it eliminated the Fairness Doctrine.41  But this 
explosion in numbers of sources has not transformed the media into an 
Adam Smith type of marketplace in which truth always prevails. 
Under the marketplace model, there is no effective solution to the 
enormous volume of ugly and offensive speech.  The model simply 
asserts that “in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, 
and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing 
space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”42  But this 
 38. Id.  As one observer noted, “entertainment programs are generally mediocre at 
best.”  Id. 
 39. 250 U.S. at 630–31. 
 40. Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific 
Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 279 (2003). 
 41. R. Randall Rainey, S.J., The Public’s Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, 
Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public 
Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 297 (1993).  For an 
explanation of the Fairness Doctrine, see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 
369–71 (1969). 
 42. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) (citing Boos 
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). 




presumes that a public debate is occurring, that the speech in the public 
domain is even capable of debate, that this speech is more than mere 
images meant to manipulate emotions rather than contribute to some 
rational discussion, and that music videos are as communicative in a 
First Amendment sense as newspaper editorials. 
The marketplace solution to any “harmful speech” is to simply have 
more speech, as if this additional speech will rectify and drive out the 
bad.  But there is no logical speech that can somehow rectify the 
irrational impressions given by various forms of entertainment.  Music 
videos are not debating partners; nor do these forms of entertainment 
allow for contemporaneous countervailing debate.  A music video does 
not include space at the end of the video for opponents to engage in 
political debate.  A video game does not give equal time to critics to 
make their point.  Music videos and video games are monopolistic 
media—they allow for nothing other than their preordained programming. 
In reality, the “more speech” solution of the marketplace model has 
had a boomerang effect.  By flooding individuals with inane, ugly, and 
indecent speech, it has dulled their senses and diminished their ability to 
discern quality, much less truth.43  The “more speech” solution has also 
had a negative effect on the nation’s democratic process.  A deluge of 
entertainment has had a crowding-out effect on political speech.44  
Audience time is limited, and all speech competes against each other for 
public attention.45  Consequently, the greater supply of easy, hypnotic 
entertainment, the less demand for the more rigorous and thoughtful 
political speech.  So in a way, the age of abundant media speech has 
produced a First Amendment scarcity problem—a scarcity of public 
attention to the speech of political and social issues on which a 
democracy must depend. 
With the passage of time, the faults and shortcomings of the marketplace 
model have become apparent.  If competition in the communications 
marketplace truly did correct all pernicious ideas, then there would not 
still be the violent, racist, hate-filled, and sexually exploitive speech that 
continues to thrive.  Perhaps the reason why the good has not smothered 
 43. “[D]iscretion, a fragile virtue at best, is almost impossible to cultivate in a 
wholly uncensored culture like our own.”  Diana West, All That Trash, 156 PUB. INT. 
131, 132 (2004) (reviewing KID STUFF: MARKETING SEX AND VIOLENCE TO AMERICA’S 
CHILDREN (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2003)). 
 44. One study of nightly network television news, for instance, revealed that in 
1988 there was an average of thirty-eight minutes per month of coverage of entertainment 
stories.  But just two years later, that average had almost doubled, to sixty-eight minutes.  
J. Max Robins, Nets’ Newscasts Increase Coverage of Entertainment, VARIETY July 18, 
1990, at 3. 
 45. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 409. 
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the bad is because human beings do not arrive at all their attitudes and 
proclivities through a process of rational thought.  Emotion and base 
instinct can play a crucial role.  And it is to emotion and instinct that so 
much of the electronic media caters: to anger and lust and greed and 
insecurity and the pulsating feel of adrenaline.  A primal appeal to these 
emotions and instincts is how so much of contemporary media 
entertainment is marketed.  But this primal appeal also renders 
entertainment programming immune from competition with rational 
ideas.  The two are as different as apples and sledgehammers. 
Recognizing the primal characteristic of some forms of speech has led 
judges to carve out certain exceptions, like obscenity and fighting words.  
Because these forms of speech have no truth value, courts have denied 
them First Amendment protection.  Such “low value” speech includes 
lewd or profane speech, which has “no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas,”46 and “epithets or personal abuse,” which are “not in any 
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by 
the Constitution . . . .”47
IV.  THE MARKETPLACE MODEL AND THE DOCTRINE OF                   
“CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES” 
In 2003, the Supreme Court handed down its decision on the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance bill, which abolished “soft money” 
contributions to national party committees and placed restrictions on 
fundraising by federal officeholders and candidates.48  Although the bill 
severely limited the rights of people and groups to engage in various 
types of political speech, the Court in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission49 upheld it—a bill that clearly exceeded the existing limits 
of First Amendment doctrine, as laid down in various post-Watergate 
judicial opinions.50  It is a decision that can be summed up in one phrase: 
 46. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 47. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940). 
 48. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Perhaps the most important of these is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–59 
(1976) (per curiam).  For post-Watergate decisions concerning the attempted regulation 
of campaign speech, see, for example, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (declaring that limitations 
on individual political expenditures restricted “political expression ‘at the core of our 
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms’”) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–95 (1978) 
(rejecting the systematic corruption argument as a rationale for restricting political 




changed circumstances.  According to the Court, the McCain-Feingold 
bill was designed “to purge national politics” of the “pernicious 
influence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions.”51  Thus, the Court 
approved of legislation that just several decades earlier would have been 
declared unconstitutional.52  But by the time the McCain-Feingold bill 
came to the Court, circumstances had changed from the era of First 
National v. Bellotti,53 where the Court rejected the “systemic corruption” 
argument as a rationale for restricting political speech. 
Just as with political campaign advertisements, there have been 
demands for new restrictions of indecent material appearing on radio, 
television, and the Internet, but the courts have steadfastly opposed any 
such restrictions.  While changed circumstances have certainly occurred 
in the quantity and quality of media content, the courts have resisted 
making the type of doctrinal adjustments to entertainment speech that it 
made in McConnell v. FEC regarding political speech. 
V.  THE PERVASIVENESS OF INDECENCY 
The vast majority of current free speech disputes involve entertainment 
speech that is accused of being vile, vulgar, or violent.  Public complaints of 
broadcast indecency have multiplied exponentially.54  The FCC Consumer 
and Governmental Affairs Bureau reported a “huge increase” in such 
complaints in 2003.55  The FCC defines indecency as language that 
“depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs.”56
speech); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 
(1981) (striking down an ordinance placing ceilings on contributions to committees 
formed to support or oppose certain ballot measures); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (overturning various restrictions on the 
expenditures of political parties), rev’d, 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
 51. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93 (quoting United States v. Int’l Union United Auto. 
Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957)). 
 52. Three decades earlier, the Supreme Court had declared that the First 
Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office.”  Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).  
Five years later, Buckley overturned limitations on individual political expenditures.  424 
U.S. at 39–51.  Five years after that, the Court struck down an ordinance limiting 
contributions to committees formed to support or oppose certain ballot measures.  
Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 300. 
 53. 435 U.S. at 788–92. 
 54. During the third quarter of 2003, consumer complaints about indecency in 
broadcasting increased from 351 to 19,920 complaints.  Mark Wigfield, FCC Reports Spike 
in Complaints About Broadcast Indecency, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 21, 2003. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, How Far is Too Far?  The Line Between “Offensive” 
and “Indecent” Speech, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 327, 332 (1996).  The Commission has also 
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One reason for all the public complaints is the unpredictability of 
indecency in the media.  The entertainment industry tells unwilling 
viewers that the solution to offensive speech is not to watch it, to “avert 
one’s eyes” from it.  But this presumes that the public knows in advance 
when and where such speech will occur.  As evidenced by the 2004 
Super Bowl halftime show, such predictability is no longer possible.57  
People cannot even watch the nation’s premier sporting event without 
seeing images they do not want, nor should expect, their children to see.  
Cable television, segments of the music industry, the Internet, and video 
games are “expanding the reach—and depths—of the media cesspool 
exponentially.”58  Even on broadcast television, recreational sex is 
glorified about six times as often as it is criticized.59
Unquestionably, the Internet is a democratizing medium, offering 
anyone with a computer the ability to speak and share her opinions.  But 
it is also capable of conveying an almost unlimited amount of hate, 
pornography, violence, and vulgarity.60  Contrary to the Reno Court’s 
assumptions, it is not difficult or complicated for children to log on to 
the Internet; nor is it difficult to find sites dedicated to pornography and 
violence.61  Even if a person did not intentionally look for those sites, 
they would find them anyway.  Pop-up advertisements alert the user to 
such sites, inviting access through just a click of the mouse.  Or, a user 
might just end up in one of those sites accidentally.62  And unlike many 
ruled that indecency includes explicit references to sexual intercourse, orgasms, 
masturbation, and other sexual conduct, as well as patently offensive references to male 
or female genitalia.  Id. at 334. 
 57. During the 2004 Superbowl half-time show, singer Janet Jackson bared her 
breast on a television broadcast, sparking national outcry.  Janet Jackson Superbowl 
Flash Sparks Outrage, ABC NEWSONLINE, at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/ 
s1036637.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2004). 
 58. West, supra note 43, at 131.  The depravity of many music lyrics is illustrated 
by the group Nine Inch Nails’ song, Big Man with a Gun: “And I have a big gun.  Got 
me a big old [expletive] and I, I like to have fun.  Held against your forehead, I’ll make 
you suck it.  Maybe I’ll put a hole in your head . . . I’m hard as [expletive] steel and I’ve 
got the power . . . I’m going to come all over you . . . me and my [expletive] gun.” 
 59. S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., PRIME TIME: HOW TV PORTRAYS AMERICAN 
CULTURE 404 (1994). 
 60. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997).  The Court found that “[s]exually 
explicit material on the Internet . . . ‘extend[ed] from the modestly titillating to the 
hardest-core,’” and that this material could be accessed “unintentionally during the 
course of an imprecise search.”  Id. at 853. 
 61. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 200 (2003). 
 62. For example, a slight mistype, “www.whitehouse.com” (instead of www. 
whitehouse.gov) will put the user right into a pornography site. 




of the early predictions of the Internet, it is not used primarily for 
delivering text, thus posing less of a temptation to children.63
Crucial to the Court’s holding in American Library Ass’n was the 
finding that children could unintentionally be exposed to sexually 
explicit material on the Internet.64  By this time, national surveys showed 
that a quarter of all school children had inadvertently downloaded 
pornography while at a public library.65  This finding coincided with 
other studies that had been conducted on Internet pornography.66  As the 
Washington Post described it, the Internet was “the largest pornography 
store in the history of mankind.”67  And contrary to the Court’s 
implication in Reno, studies found that most children demonstrate a 
computer “proficiency that far surpasses that of their parents” and 
generally have little problem finding whatever material they want on the 
Internet.68  Adolescents between the ages of tweleve and seventeen have 
been cited as one of the “largest consumers of ‘adult-oriented’ material 
on the Internet.”69
Despite requiring a credit card for access, most pornography sites 
offer extensive free previews, thereby allowing children to see graphic 
sexual and violent images without going through any age verification 
process.70  Furthermore, even though many pornographic sites carry 
disclaimers warning viewers that the material contains sexually explicit 
images, “these disclaimers ‘are about as effective as constructing a 
retaining wall out of tissue paper.’”71  In addition, search engines have 
made it even easier for inexperienced users to find sexually explicit web 
sites; and because Internet searches take only a few seconds, they can 
easily be executed by a student in a classroom while the teacher is in a 
 63. See Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information 
Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 35 (1995). 
 64. 539 U.S. at 200. 
 65. 144 CONG. REC. S8611 (1998).  This contrasted sharply with the district 
court’s finding in Reno that accidental encounters of content on the Internet rarely occur.  
See 521 U.S. at 869. 
 66. See generally Peter G. Drever, III, The Best of Both Worlds: Financing 
Software Filters for the Classroom and Avoiding First Amendment Liability, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659 (1998). 
 67. Hearing on Crimes Against Children: The Nature and Threat of Sexual 
Predators on the Internet, Before the Crime Subcomm., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 1, 33 (Nov. 7, 1997) (statement of Cathy Cleaver, Director of Legal Policy, 
Family Research Council). 
 68. Id. at 32. 
 69. Elizabeth M. Shea, Note, The Children’s Internet Protection Act of 1999: Is 
Internet Filtering Software the Answer? 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 167, 184 (1999). 
 70. Id. at 178–79. 
 71. Id. at 179 (quoting Legislative Proposals to Protect Children from 
Inappropriate Materials on the Internet Before the House Comm. On Commerce, 105th 
Cong. 22 (Sept. 11, 1998)). 
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different part of the room, and the student can exit the site in a matter of 
seconds if an authority figure approaches. 
The Internet is no replica of eighteenth-century town meetings, in 
which people openly shared and debated opinions.  One big difference 
with the Internet is its anonymity feature.72  Speech can take on an 
entirely different character when it is being conducted anonymously, and 
it can more easily lead to the dangers of stalking, deception, and 
manipulation.  During the eighteenth century, taking public responsibility 
for one’s speech necessarily imposed some constraints on that speech.73  
A sort of social custom and decorum served to censor out the more 
violent or crude statements.  But today, with the Internet, there is no 
social custom available.  There is nothing except for the user’s own 
ability to censor unwanted, offensive speech. 
The marketplace model presumes that enough seeds of good speech 
will eventually choke out the weeds.  But in reality, the opposite is 
occurring.  Sexually graphic and brutally violent songs increasingly fill 
the airways.  Imitators of Howard Stern74 find new time slots for their 
raw dialogue.  The rapper Eminem, now also an actor, shouts out: 
“[Expletive] that.  Take drugs.  Rape Sluts.”  He is called a revolutionary,75 
but he is certainly no Tom Paine.76  If this is what results from free 
speech theories focused solely on the speaker, then perhaps what is 
needed are theories that instead look to the listener. 
VI.  A SHIFTING OF BURDENS 
A.  The Futility of Averting One’s Eyes 
Traditional First Amendment analysis focuses on all the possible 
burdens that any governmental regulation might place on speech.  
 72. In the 104th Congress, Senator Jim Exon introduced a bill to prohibit 
anonymous messages “with [the] intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any 
person . . . who receives the communication.”  S. 314, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(B) (1995). 
 73. See STEPHEN BOTEIN, Printers and the American Revolution, in THE PRESS AND 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11, 21, 32, 37–40 (Bernard Bailyn & John B. Hench eds., 
1980).  See generally EDWIN EMERY & MICHAEL EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA (4th 
ed. 1978); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE (1958). 
 74. Stern hosts a radio show that has been the frequent subject of indecency complaints. 
 75. Matt Mulder, Self Destruction by Anger, 21 MICH. REV. Issue 7, at 
http://www.michiganreview.com. 
 76. In a song titled “Kill You,” presumably about his mother, Eminem raps: “Just 
bend over and take it like a slut, ok Ma? . . . Bitch, I’ma kill you.”  Eminem, Kill You, on 
THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Interscope Records 2000). 




This exclusive focus is illustrated by Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.77  At issue in Denver 
Area were provisions in the Cable Television Consumer Protection  and 
Competition Act of 1992 requiring cable operators to place indecent 
programs on a separate channel, to block that channel, and to unblock it 
within thirty days of a subscriber’s written request for access.78  In 
holding these regulations unconstitutional, the Supreme Court was 
concerned with inconveniences and burdens to would-be viewers of 
indecent programming, including, for instance, the viewer who might 
want a single show, as opposed to the entire channel, or the viewer who 
might want to choose a channel without any advance planning (the 
“surfer”), or the one who worries about the danger to his reputation that 
might result if he makes a written request to subscribe to the channel.  
However, none of these burdens presented insurmountable obstacles.  
Each one of these types of viewers could obtain access to the desired 
programming by simply following the established procedures.  Furthermore, 
even though the Court recognized that the purpose of the regulations was 
to protect minors, a compelling purpose, and that the regulations only 
applied to sexual material (and not the kind of vitally important political 
information present, for instance, in the “Pentagon Papers” case),79 the 
Court still struck them down, focusing exclusively on the provisions’ 
burdensome impact on the programming available to adults.  In doing 
so, the Court affirmed the principle of Butler v. Michigan80 in that the 
Constitution does not permit the state to reduce the material available to 
adults to the level of what is appropriate for children.  The Court 
followed this principle even though, in terms of relative burdens, it may 
be easier for adults to access indecent material than it is for parents to 
 77. 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 78. Id. at 732–35.  In addition to these restrictions, the regulations also required the 
programmers of leased channels to alert cable operators of their intent to broadcast 
indecent material before the scheduled broadcast date.  Id. at 735. 
 79. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (affirming the D.C. 
Circuit’s injunction against the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing 
the contents of a classified study entitled, “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on 
Viet Nam Policy”). 
 80. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).  In striking down a Michigan statute making it a 
misdemeanor to sell or make available to the general reading public any book containing 
obscene language, the Court stated, 
The State insists that . . . by thus quarantining the general . . . public against 
books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile 
innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare.  Surely 
this is to burn the house to roast the pig. . . . 
   We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which 
it is said to deal.  The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult 
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. 
Id. at 383–84. 
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have their children avoid it.  And even though the Court, as it did in 
Pacifica, acknowledged the invasive nature of television, it refused to let 
this feature justify the regulations, which still did not amount to a 
complete ban on the subject speech.81
Continuing with the exclusive speaker-focus of Denver Area, the 
Court ruled in Playboy Entertainment that audiences are generally 
expected to assume the burden of averting their eyes whenever they are 
confronted with unwanted or offensive speech.82  Playboy involved a 
challenge to a provision in the Telecommunications Act of 199683 which 
required cable television operators providing channels “primarily 
dedicated to sexually-oriented programming” to either “fully scramble or 
otherwise fully block” those channels or to limit their transmission to the 
hours between 10 p.m. and 6 p.m., when children are unlikely to be 
among the viewing audience.84  Even before the enactment of this 
provision, cable operators used signal scrambling to limit access to 
certain programs to paying customers.85  But this scrambling was 
imprecise and often led to signal bleed, so the time-channeling 
regulation was intended to shield children from hearing or seeing images 
resulting from such signal bleed.86  Yet even though the Court 
recognized the strong state interest in shielding young viewers from such 
programming, it still struck down the law, holding that it constituted too 
great a burden on adult viewers.87
The potential burdens on adults wishing to view sexually explicit 
programming was the only side of the speech equation at which the 
Court really looked.  The programming confinement was intended to 
help shield children from indecent programming, but the Court did not 
 81. The Denver Area Court could not arrive at a majority opinion defining the 
standard of review for regulations of indecent cable programming.  518 U.S. at 741–42.  
Justice Breyer, in his plurality opinion, refused to define “a rigid single standard” for 
cable, stating that it would not be prudent to set a standard amidst all the “changes taking 
place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure related to telecommunications.”  
Id. at 742.  This amounted to an explicit recognition of “changed circumstances,” and 
gives further support to a private right to censor that would not rely on “rigid single 
standards” but would allow individuals the ability to regulate cable programming for 
themselves. 
 82. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
 83. 47 U.S.C. § 561 (2000). 
 84. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 807. 




(other than by assumptions) consider any burden to a parent’s private 
right to censor such material if the regulations were struck down.  
Instead, the Court passed over the whole issue by simply stating that it 
was the duty of the listener to “avert [their] eyes.”88  In so doing, the 
Court placed the burden entirely on those wishing to exercise their 
private right to censor within their own home. 
Justice Breyer’s Playboy dissent focused particularly on the issue of 
relative burdens.  First, Justice Breyer noted that the law in question 
placed a burden on adult programmers, not a ban.89  Second, he observed 
that the law applies only to channels that “broadcast ‘virtually 100% 
sexually explicit’ material.”90  And third, he recognized that, because of 
signal bleed, approximately twenty-nine million children were potentially 
exposed each year to sexually explicit programming.91  Given the compelling 
interests of child protection at issue, Justice Breyer concluded that the 
majority’s proposed alternative was not at all an effective one.92  In 
support of this conclusion, he cited evidence reflecting many problems 
people had experienced in trying to get their cable operator to block 
certain channels—problems that come as no surprise to anyone who has 
ever tried to get their cable company to fix something.93
The growth of a media society and the corresponding explosion of 
media speech have made the burdens of averting one’s eyes ever more 
onerous.  Likewise, the demise of social customs which once imposed an 
unofficial censorship on offensive speech have put even more burdens 
on averting one’s eyes, to the point where it may be nearly impossible to 
avoid offensive speech.  This lopsidedness of burdens has been a natural 
result of the marketplace metaphor, which focuses only on increasing the 
 88. Id. at 813 (rejecting the government’s attempted restrictions, and holding that 
those offended by such programming should simply avert their eyes).  For other cases, 
see, for example, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206, 217 (1975) 
(striking down an ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from exhibiting nudity 
as an infringement against First Amendment rights).  The Court placed the burden of 
eluding exposure to the speech on the viewer, opining that “the burden normally falls 
upon the viewer to . . . ‘avert[] [his] eyes.’”  Id. at 210–11 (quoting Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).  Similarly, in Cohen v. California, the Court refused to permit 
censorship of the message “[Expletive] the Draft” that was printed on the back of a 
jacket worn in the public corridors of the Los Angeles courthouse, even though 
passersby would be involuntarily exposed to the message.  403 U.S. at 16, 26 (1971). 
 89. According to Justice Breyer, “[a]dults may continue to watch adult channels, 
though less conveniently, by watching at night, recording programs with a VCR, or by 
subscribing to digital cable with better blocking systems.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 845 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 839 (quoting Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 
2d 702, 707 (D. Del. 1998)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 841, 847. 
 93. Id. at 843–44. 
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amount of social speech.  But during an age of abundant speech, it is 
time to reconsider this dramatic inequality of burdens. 
The judicial striving for a burden-free environment regarding access to 
speech not only makes private censorship nearly impossible, but also 
contradicts the experience of the constitutional period.  During the late 
eighteenth century, people did not have immediate and unconstrained 
access to social speech.94  They had to expend great effort to receive 
their news and political opinions.95  Social speech was not like a faucet 
that could be turned on and off whenever the urge hit; it was not like the 
raging flood that it is today. 
It is a perversion of the First Amendment to think of freedom of 
speech as a flooding of speech.  It is a mistake to think of free speech as 
effortless or automatic speech.  And it is a violation of people’s speech 
and privacy rights to make parents disconnect all televisions just so that 
other adults do not have to wait until ten o’clock to watch the Playboy 
Channel.  Adults have almost unlimited access to indecent speech: adult 
video and book stores; adult theaters; adult mail-order outlets; adult 
telephone services; Internet pornography sites.  To limit a cable channel’s 
indecent programming to certain hours of the day, while greatly aiding a 
family’s private right to censor, poses relatively minute burdens on an 
adult’s ability to receive sexually explicit speech. 
Under the marketplace model of the First Amendment, the parents and 
children bear all the burdens.  The recent Supreme Court decision in 
United States v. American Library Ass’n, however, illustrates a more 
balanced placement of burdens.96  In upholding a law requiring public 
libraries to install filtering software on their Internet computers, the 
Court ruled that the law did not impose a complete ban on a patron’s 
Internet access to pornography, but it did require any adult wishing to 
view such material to ask a librarian to unblock the desired site.97  
Opponents of the law argued that this requirement was overly restrictive, 
as some patrons might be too embarrassed to approach a librarian with 
 94. See generally THOMAS C. LEONARD, THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE BIRTH OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL REPORTING (1986); PATRICK M. GARRY, THE AMERICAN VISION OF 
A FREE PRESS (1990). 
 95. LEONARD, supra note 94. 
 96. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 97. Id. at 209.  At issue was Congress’s Child Internet Protection Act, which 
forbids public libraries to receive federal assistance for Internet access unless they install 
software to block obscene or pornographic images and to prevent minors from accessing 
harmful material to them. 




their request.98  Dismissing this argument, the Court ruled that “the 
Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a 
public library without any risk of embarrassment.”99
This decision, in its rational look at the relative burdens involved, 
bucked the trend followed in Playboy Entertainment, in which just about 
any burden on an adult’s access to indecent speech, no matter what the 
risk to children, is seen as unconstitutional.  In American Library Ass’n, 
the goal of protecting children from unwanted speech, while allowing 
them access to the wealth of information on the Internet, overshadowed 
the small burden on adults who could still access pornography with just 
a request to the librarian.  It was a decision that finally elevated the 
filtering rights of parents above a mere interest that always gets shoved 
aside in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
A more balanced approach to burdens, as well as a greater recognition 
of the rights of viewers and listeners can also be found in Kovacs v. 
Cooper, where the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use on 
public streets of sound trucks that emitted “loud and raucous noises.”100  
According to Justice Frankfurter, citizens in their homes should be 
protected from “aural aggression.”101  Although the statute essentially 
created a regulatory wall that blocked otherwise constitutionally 
protected speech, the Court noted that the “unwilling listener is . . . 
practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud 
speakers except through the protection of the municipality.”102  It did not 
matter to the Court that not every person in the community wanted to 
keep out the information broadcast by the sound trucks, or that some 
might actually want to receive the information.  The Court found it 
sufficient that “some” in the community found the sound trucks 
objectionable.103  Likewise, in a later case, the Court upheld a regulation 
designed to prevent disturbance of nearby residents by requiring that 
music performers in a Central Park band shell use a sound system 
provided by the city.104
Under the marketplace metaphor, courts dealing with free speech 
issues have traditionally required an opt-out scheme rather than an opt-in 
one.105  Unwilling listeners must opt-out of the unwanted speech 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949). 
 101. Id. at 89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 86–87. 
 103. Id. at 81. 
 104. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 105. The ruling in Reno v. ACLU was consistent with this pattern, holding that 
government may not require listeners to opt in to speech that is deemed offensive by the 
majority when individual opt out is feasible.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see 
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environment.  The burden is on them to leave, to extricate themselves.  
They must either constantly monitor their children on the Internet, or 
else they must pull the plug.  They have to hope and pray as they surf 
through the cable channels, or else they must disconnect the television.  
An opt-in requirement on certain kinds of “low value” speech, however, 
would attempt to balance the burdens.  If an adult wishes to view 
indecent programming, he or she must make some effort to opt into it, to 
access it with some personal identification number, or to subscribe to a 
special channel.  With such an opt-in requirement for indecent speech, 
especially given the pervasiveness of it in a media society, there is no 
decrease in the amount of speech in the system, just a step required 
before accessing it. 
Even though the Court has taken the position that the First Amendment 
requires opt-out,106 it has never examined precisely how feasible it is for 
unwilling viewers or listeners to opt out, certainly not in the same way 
that it has examined all the potential burdens placed on those wishing to 
opt in.  Furthermore, making opting-out even more difficult with the Internet, 
the government cannot zone cyberspace—certainly not as it can do when 
restricting adult theaters to a red light district or requiring adult magazines 
to be sold in plain brown wrappers.  But is it fair that parents of limited 
resources be compelled to bear the burden of purchasing filters, just so 
the producers and patrons of pornography not incur the least inconvenience?  
Is it fair to make parents bear the sole burden of monitoring their 
children’s every interaction with an all-pervasive media, just so that the 
unfettered freedom of pornographers not be compromised in any way? 
also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 26 (1971) (holding that, in the public square, 
persons are presumed able to avert their eyes from speech they find offensive and move 
on); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (holding that the government 
may not screen out “communist political propaganda” mail materials in advance and 
require potential recipients to opt in); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 
61 (1983) (holding that the federal government could not ban the unsolicited mailing of 
contraceptive advertisements, thus declaring a law that required opt in unconstitutional). 
 106. The courts in the past have been hostile to opt-in schemes.  The guiding 
doctrine of First Amendment decisions has been that the government may not require 
listeners to opt in to speech deemed offensive by the majority when individual opt-out is 
physically or socially feasible.  Courts have essentially assumed that the First 
Amendment requires opt-out.  See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 305 (holding that the Post Office 
could not screen out communist mail from foreign sources and require potential 
recipients to request affirmatively its delivery (or opt in)); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. 
of Trustees, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 797 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding the requirement that adult 
patrons wishing to view indecent materials on the Internet submit a written request to the 
library staff as having a severe chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms). 




As Professor Nachbar notes, “[v]ery few parents have the time to 
supervise all of the time that their children spend on the Internet.”107  
Nor is parental monitoring “a real alternative for families in which both 
parents must, or choose, to work, or for those headed by a single 
parent.”108  Furthermore, “unless the parent were, for example, to open 
each [web] page with the child looking away and only allow the child to 
view the page after a parental preview, there is no way to keep the child 
from taking in the content while the parent is evaluating its 
appropriateness.”109  Given these problems, however, and given the 
recent revisionist thinking in American Library Ass’n, the courts may 
now be willing to consider applying a Pacifica-type approach to the 
Internet that gives added weight to user and viewer interests.110
In his Playboy dissent, arguing in support of the time-channeling 
requirement for sexually explicit programming, Justice Breyer favored 
an opt-in scheme over an opt-out one.111  The opt-in scheme would essentially 
require that those adults wishing to view the adult programming take 
affirmative steps to obtain or subscribe to such programming.112  A 
realization of the quantity and accessability of indecent speech, as well 
as the potential effects of such speech on minors, has seemed to make 
the courts more willing to follow the opt-in approach proposed by 
Justice Breyer in his Playboy dissent.  Whereas in Denver Area the 
Court ruled as overly burdensome a requirement that people had to make 
a specific request from their cable operator to receive indecent 
programming,113 in American Library Ass’n the Court upheld a 
requirement that adults approach librarians in person to have the 
 107. Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government 
Regulation to Preserve the Internet’s Unregulated Character, 85 MINN. L. REV. 215, 220 
(2000). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 221. 
 110. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 111. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 837, 841–42 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  An opt-in scheme also reflects a more balanced middle ground 
than the usual dichotomy characterizing traditional free speech thought.  Under that 
dichotomy, there are two polar-opposite systems of expression.  One is a system in 
which “top-down regulation of expression is the exception,” and the other is a system in 
which “top-down regulation is the rule.” Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern 
Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 232 (1996).  A system in which top-down 
regulation is the exception is similar to the marketplace model, in which speech is 
maximized; whereas a system in which top-down regulation is the rule is one in which 
government or elites makes all decisions about content.  Id. 
 112. An illustration of an opt-in scheme is the school voucher program upheld by 
the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).  The opt-in scheme helps 
facilitate choice, by giving individuals the power to choose an option they may not have 
otherwise had. 
 113. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755–
56 (1996). 
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blocking software disabled so that they could access sexually explicit 
sites.114  As long as the burdens do not amount to a complete ban, they 
may be allowable under this new opt-in scheme that seems to be gaining 
strength and to which American Library Ass’n gave impetus.115
Opt-in communication schemes, which require listeners to take some 
affirmative action to access certain kinds of speech, impose no greater 
constitutional costs than do opt-out schemes, which require that 
unwilling listeners assume all the burdens of avoiding unwanted speech.  
The First Amendment does not mandate that speakers incur absolutely 
no obstacles or burdens in exposing listeners to their speech, just as it 
does not mandate listeners to be virtually powerless to determine the 
images and speech to which they are exposed.116  As it stands now, 
however, the marketplace model completely favors the speaker; it 
completely favors the unwanted speech.  It holds that speakers should 
incur no burdens in speaking, and that willing listeners should have to 
make no effort to receive.  But the unwilling listeners are left helpless, 
forced to bear the entire burden of dealing with all the garbage produced 
by the American media.  This is not the message of the First 
Amendment: that freedom is somehow advanced when citizens cannot 
use their democratic power to demand that others not be given license to 
bombard society with degrading images and corrupt their children with 
brazen impunity. 
The First Amendment, as far as speakers go, means that people can 
speak without penalty and that their speech cannot be banned just 
because the government does not like it.  It does not mean that listeners 
never have to work to be exposed to any and all kinds of speech, nor 
does it mean that unwilling listeners have no constitutional rights amidst 
a pervasive media. 
 114. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003). 
 115. Id.  In a case addressing restrictions placed on unsolicited fax advertisements, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the government has a substantial interest in preventing the 
shift of advertising costs from sender to recipient.  Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 
F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).  Those costs included paper and toner expenses, as well as 
interfering with the receipt of desired faxes.  This refusal to make recipients bear the full 
burden of unwanted speech can also be extended beyond the economic realm.  And just 
because a speaker no longer enjoys a completely unburdened right to speak does not 
mean that her First Amendment liberties have been erased, particularly when those new 
burdens are necessary to give the recipients a greater level of freedom. 
 116. And just as the First Amendment recognizes a right to “non-religion,” so too 
should it recognize a right to “non-speech.” 




B.  The First Amendment Right of Communicative Control 
Fundamentally, the First Amendment is not just about increasing the 
volume and plentitude of speech.  It goes much deeper than that, to the 
roots of human liberty.  The First Amendment speech clause is about 
individual control.  It is about the control of one’s communicative 
process.117  For the speaker, this means the freedom to state her opinions 
without government punishment.  It means the freedom to put those 
opinions into some avenue of public circulation.  Although the courts 
have steadfastly protected this right of control,118 they have not gone full 
circle.  They have not, aside from isolated situations, given any control 
to the listener.119  They have not recognized any legal right to be 
selective in the speech to which she is exposed, certainly not to the 
degree that the courts have given rights to speakers to expose others to 
their opinions.  In this regard, the courts have failed to recognize the 
communicative aspect of speech; they have only focused on its delivery. 
Any viable communicative interchange, which after all is the whole 
point of protecting speech, involves an exchange of ideas between a 
willing speaker and a willing listener.120  But in the great majority of 
cases, whenever these two are in conflict, whenever a willing speaker 
confronts an unwilling listener, the courts yield to the rights of the 
former, ignoring those of the latter.  Thus, it is only the willingness of 
the speaker that has been given real constitutional significance.  
However, in a time of such pervasive media, when the individual listener 
is increasingly losing her control to be selective about the media diet that 
 117. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: 
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 
104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1621 (1995) (making the argument that the way to an open, 
interactive communication system is through “user control”—giving individuals a right 
of shut off). 
 118. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I], 
aff’d, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II]. 
 119. Id.  Giving people the ability to decide or control what ideas or information is 
appropriate for them was an underlying goal of the V-chip, which resulted from the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, mandating that televisions be equipped with a chip 
that will permit programs with certain ratings to be blocked from a person’s home TV 
set.  47 U.S.C. § 330(c)(1)–(4) (2000).  In December of 1996, industry lenders 
announced a ratings system that would be used with the V-chip.  Lawrie Mifflin, TV 
Industry Leaders Unveil Technique of Rating Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at A18.  
This development of a ratings system means that the V-chip law will probably not be 
challenged in court.  But if it were challenged, the constitutionality “[would] turn on who 
establishes the rating system and who determines the rating for a particular program.”  
Howard M. Wasserman, Second-Best Solution: The First Amendment, Broadcast 
Indecency, and the V-Chip, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1190, 1225 (1997). 
 120. For the Court’s views on the notion of willing speaker, see Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977), and for the existence of some rights of a willing 
listener, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821–22 (1974). 
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she and her children end up consuming, the notion of a First Amendment 
right of listener control certainly seems warranted by the doctrine of 
changed circumstances. 
Underlying any individual freedom or right is the ability to control.  
As Steven Heyman argues, liberty of speech should be understood “as 
part of the right to control one’s own person.”121  It is the individual’s 
right to control that confers freedom.  This is the fundamental test of 
liberty.  Control defines individual autonomy, and individual autonomy 
is at the very root not only of the personal freedoms laid out in the Bill 
of Rights, but also in the very essence of democracy. 
As has been so often stated by both courts and scholars, the free 
speech clause of the First Amendment serves to guarantee individual 
autonomy in matters of speech and personal beliefs.  According to C. 
Edwin Baker, the key principle underlying the First Amendment is the 
“respect for individual integrity and autonomy . . . to use speech to 
develop herself or to influence or interact with others in a manner that 
corresponds to her values.”122  In the past, this notion of autonomy has 
been applied primarily to speakers, protecting them in their freedom to 
define and develop themselves through their individual speech.123  But 
autonomy can also be applied to listeners, especially because most 
people in connection with the public domain spend more time taking in 
the speech of others than in putting out their own speech.  Consequently, 
for many, personal growth and self-realization will be determined more 
by the ideas and images they receive from other speakers than by those 
they express themselves. 
Speech is a component of something larger—the communicative 
process.  Outside this process, speech is a useless and irrelevant 
endeavor.  Moreover, speech is not just an individual act; it is a social 
act as well.  Freedom of speech, then, is the liberty to engage in the 
social act of communication and to form certain social relationships.124  
So in the course of protecting speech, the First Amendment really 
protects this social, communicative process.  Therefore, to analyze 
speech, one must look to the broader context of this process.  And if 
 121. Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 531, 568 (2003). 
 122. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989). 
 123. Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations and 
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1326 (1998). 
 124. Id. at 1348. 




speech is viewed within this larger communicative process, then the 
speaker cannot be given exclusive privilege.  Nor can the self-realization 
of the speaker be allowed to dominate over the self-realization of the 
other participants in the process.125
If a free and open communicative process is to have any meaning, it 
must be a process involving autonomous participants.126  For the listener, 
this means the ability to decide for herself what ideas she will 
incorporate into forming her convictions—what images and opinions she 
will consider in deciding what is good in life, bad in politics, false in 
faith and beautiful in art.  If autonomy is synonymous with self-
determination, and the First Amendment seeks to ensure individual 
autonomy, then an autonomous individual should also have the right to 
choose what images and ideas from the outside world to reject in the 
formation of one’s character.  Just as a person has the right to speak or 
be silent, so too should a listener have the right to listen or reject.127  
Under such an equality, speakers should not have a greater right to force 
their speech on unwilling listeners than those unwilling listeners have to 
reject and avoid that speech.  Thus, speakers should not be given the 
right to dominate the communicative process in such a way that 
unwilling listeners are forced to simply relent. 
Some scholars propose a complete shift from a speaker-centered view 
of free speech to an audience-centered view.128  This proposal would 
cast freedom of expression strictly as a right of audiences to receive the 
speech, not as a right of speakers to speak.  But this exclusive focus on 
audiences has the same fault as the more traditional and singular focus 
on speakers.  They both fail to incorporate the two-sided nature of 
communication.  Indeed, the constitutional guarantee of free speech is 
 125. Id. 
 126. Just as a speaker should be free to achieve self-fulfillment through expressing 
his thoughts, a listener should be free from being exposed to speech that violates her 
sense of autonomy and self-realization.  Just as a person should be free from emotional 
distress at the hands of another, so too should she be free from the unwanted intrusion of 
speech that violates that which sets the self apart from others—her sense of self dignity 
and integrity.  Id. at 1332.  A truly free communicative process means that both speakers 
and listeners are equal in their ability to participate. 
 127. See Byron Rohrig, No-Call Plaintiff Mulls Options, EVANSVILLE COURIER, July 
9, 2002, at B1.  In a case in which an Indiana state court judge rejected a constitutional 
challenge to Indiana’s “no-call” list, Circuit Court Judge Carl Heldt stated: “Although 
the First Amendment imposes strict limitations on government actions that interfere with 
the free exchange of ideas, the First Amendment does not stand as an impediment to 
private decisions to give audience to certain types of speech while avoiding others.”  
Associated Press, Judge: Indiana’s No-Call List Doesn’t Violate Free Speech, at 
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=16516 (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2005). 
 128. T. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
153, 167–68 (R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977). 
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undermined by excluding consideration of the interests of either speaker 
or listener.  Instead, what is needed is a more balanced First Amendment 
approach, one that encompasses both speaker and listener rights.  Just as 
protecting the ability of individuals to speak, the First Amendment 
should also seek to safeguard an individual’s desire to reject unwanted 
communications.  Such a balanced approach, mindful of listener 
autonomy, is especially needed given the changed circumstances caused 
by the pervasiveness of indecent media speech in modern society. 
VII.  PROTECTING THE SPEECH OF THE INARTICULATE 
Given the realities of the modern world, most people will never 
publish op-ed pieces in newspapers or host their own political talk show 
on television.  For most people, their speech acts will involve selecting 
and rejecting those ideas or expressions with which they agree or 
disagree.  Expressive freedom means that people should be free to reject 
certain unwanted speech and to disassociate themselves and their 
families from what they consider socially or morally repulsive speech.  
This expansion of individual control may mean that the speaker does not 
have absolute control over all the destinations of her speech, and that 
willing listeners may have to make some effort to receive all the 
different kinds of speech they desire. 
For most individuals, unable to inject their voice into the stream of 
mass media programming, censorship is their only way of participating 
in the marketplace of public communications.  In the modern world, 
censorship is the speech of the inarticulate, the media-outsiders.  The 
only way to voice one’s opinion about a particular message or image in 
the social marketplace may be to simply accept or reject it.  But even 
this simple opinion may not be so easy to register or voice.  Take, for 
instance, messages appearing on television.129  Approximately eighty 
percent of households subscribe to cable.  Therefore, once the cable is 
hooked up, the installation fee is paid, and the automatic bill payment is 
set up through the consumer’s bank, all the messages and images 
conveyed through all the cable and broadcast channels are already 
accepted.  The real challenge becomes how to reject those images and 
ideas that are found offensive or revolting.  There is no easy way to do 
 129. As the Supreme Court has recognized, broadcast and cable programming exert 
a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of American children.  Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744–45 (1996). 




that, no automatic system of rejection similar to the automatic bill 
payment system. 
The vast majority of Americans will never utter an opinion through 
the mass media.  Nor will they possess the technology nor the time to 
individually edit out all of the unwanted and offensive images coming 
into their home from mass media.  Instead, their only real exercise of 
control will be to censor such images in advance.  But this ability to 
censor must be real. 
In 1991, the Pennsylvania state legislature passed a law regulating the 
size of vulgarities on bumper stickers.130  The statute limited the height 
and width of letters used to spell six specific words describing bodily 
functions and sex acts.  Threatening suit to challenge the constitutionality of 
this statute, an ACLU spokesperson offered this advice to motorists 
caught behind a car with a vulgar bumper sticker: “You can look at 
traffic, the trees, the cars around you.”131  This is the averting your eyes 
solution to offensive speech.  In reality, though, how can a motorist 
possibly avert her eyes from the car in front of her?  If that is the extent 
of her ability to censor, then she really has no such ability.  Likewise, 
parents cannot realistically chase their children around all day to monitor 
the television they watch, the music they listen to, and the video games 
they play.  The media is too pervasive for parents to keep up with it.  
They need some help to perform their parental duties, just as they need 
safety caps on medicine bottles, age limits for purchasing cigarettes, and 
ingredient labels on food items. 
Modern information technology offers not only more speech, but more 
ways to deliver that speech.  Consequently, ways are being explored to 
combat the constant surge of unwanted information and to help the 
receiver control what he or she receives.132  Do-not call lists are set up 
for people who wish to avoid being contacted by telemarketers.  Laws 
are considered that would require Internet providers to furnish filtering 
software, as well as make cable and broadcast television channels carry 
outside ratings services to be used in connection with the V-chip.  
 130. WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, TWILIGHT OF LIBERTY: THE LEGACY OF THE ACLU 190 
(1994). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Many of the public complaints or worries regarding the Internet involve 
sexually explicit material.  Time magazine devoted a special issue to “cyberporn.”  See 
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38.  
President Clinton spoke of “horror stories about the inappropriate material for children 
that can be found on the Internet,” and described how “children can be victimized over 
the Internet.”  Remarks Announcing Steps to Make the Internet Family-Friendly, 33 
WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1077, 1077 (July 21, 1997).  Other 
critics worry about new communication technologies and their invasion of personal 
privacy.  See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 1609, 1612–13 (1999). 
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Indeed, many Internet users spend as much time avoiding speech as 
retrieving it, for nowhere is the abundance of speech more evident than 
in the overload of information the Internet is injecting into contemporary 
life.133
In a world of five hundred digital television channels, twenty-four 
hour cable, and an Internet on which information-carriage increased ten-
fold from 1997 to 2000,134 the problem is not too little speech, but too 
much—and especially, in terms of the kind of speech needed for an 
informed self-government, too much of the low value speech.135  There 
has been an explosion in entertainment and advertising, and in speech 
that is vulgar and sexually and violently graphic.136  And with the 
explosive growth of the Internet, “it is clear that society is demanding 
some method for shielding itself, or at the very least for shielding 
children . . . .”137
The Internet contains a plentiful supply of pornography, violence, 
vulgarity, and hate speech.138  This is a particularly worrisome problem, 
as “[n]inety percent of children between the ages of five and 
 133. The deep Web, or invisible Web (made up of information stored in databases), 
is estimated to be 400 to 550 times larger than the commonly defined World Wide Web 
(or visible Web).  The deep or invisible Web contains nearly 550 billion individual 
documents. Bright Planet, Deep Content, at http://www.brightplanet.com/deepcontent/ 
deep_web_faq.asp (2004).  For a discussion on the abundance of speech and information 
over the Internet, see Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1885, 1910–12 (2001), which discusses the abundance of the Internet and the 
consequences of “information overproduction.”  For an overall discussion on 
information overload in contemporary society and its effects, see generally KRISTAN J. 
WHEATON, THE WARNING SOLUTION: INTELLIGENT ANALYSIS IN THE AGE OF 
INFORMATION OVERLOAD (2001); DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG: SURVIVING THE 
INFORMATION GLUT (1997); NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE 
TO TECHNOLOGY (1992); RICHARD SAUL WURMAN, INFORMATION ANXIETY (1989). 
 134. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 16 (2d ed. 2002). 
 135. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 114–17 (2001) (discussing “low 
value” speech). 
 136. During a lifetime, most people will devote a full year and one-half to watching 
commercials.  RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 78 
(1996).  Pornography has become a $14 billion a year business.  PAUL S. BOYER, PURITY 
IN PRINT 345 (2d ed. 2002).  Studies have shown that most adult-oriented commercial 
web sites do not use age verification measures, and that about a quarter of them employ 
practices like mouse trapping that keep users from exiting the site.  Mitchell P. 
Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over the First Amendment: Can the Law 
Really Protect Children From Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141, 144 (2003).  Moreover, approximately three quarters of them 
displayed adult content on the first page, which was accessible to everyone.  Id. at 145. 
 137. Nachbar, supra note 107, at 218. 
 138. See supra note 132. 




seventeen . . . now use computers.”139  Almost seventy percent of the current 
traffic on the Internet is adult-oriented material,140 and approximately 
two hundred new pornographic web sites are created each day.141  In 
addition to this overwhelming supply, online pornography cannot be 
neatly cordoned off from where children can gain access to it.  Online 
pornography is just a mouse-click away from coming into anyone’s 
home.  It does not require as much deliberate or educated action as the 
courts seem to believe.142
Instead of creating new rules for each different technology, the courts 
should rely on the compelling interest of enhancing listener and viewer 
control.  Instead of basing First Amendment doctrines on the pervasiveness 
and intrusiveness of the medium, the courts should look to the pervasiveness 
and intrusiveness of the content.  If the indecent content at issue is itself 
pervasive, it should not matter whether the medium conveying that 
content is pervasive.  As Professor Polivy argues, the Court should 
analyze speech restrictions according to the degree and type of filtering 
and exclusion which individuals (readers, viewer, listeners) can perform 
for the medium in question.143
VIII.  THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC AND INDUSTRY CONTENT STANDARDS 
Over the years, and in an effort to stem the content decline, there have 
been a number of attempts to regulate television programming.  These 
efforts have ranged from channeling the broadcast of certain adult-
themed programming to times when children are less likely to be 
viewing,144 to blocking indecent programming completely,145 to creating 
a “family hour” during which programming not suitable for children is 
 139. Goldstein, supra note 136, at 143. 
 140. Shea, supra note 69, at 174. 
 141. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 10 (1998). 
 142. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853–55 (1997). 
   Computer networks, bulletin boards, and electronic e-mail are largely 
inaccessible to children. These technologies are used overwhelmingly for 
delivering text, so there is less concern . . . that a child . . . may see an 
image . . . that is offensive.  Moreover . . . computerized information is less 
likely to enter the home “accidentally.”  Enough affirmative steps must be 
taken, and sufficient control must be exercised over what information is 
received, to reduce the chance of surprise by an “indecent” image or 
sound . . . . 
Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 44 (1995). 
 143. Denise R. Polivy, Virtue By Machine: A First Amendment Analysis of the V-
chip Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1749, 1791 
(1997). 
 144. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 145. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 
(1996). 
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not shown.146  Yet despite all these regulatory attempts, the Parents Television 
Council found that, during just the one-year period from 2002 to 2003, 
sexual content on television had become more sexually explicit and 
vuglarity had become significantly more common, even during prime time. 
According to numerous commentators, the FCC has been lax in its 
oversight of programming content since the 1980s.147  When, for instance, 
the singer Bono slipped the “F word” past censors during the 2003 
broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards, the FCC took no action, ruling 
that the utterance was used as an adjective rather than a verb describing 
a sexual act.  And despite the number of public complaints, the FCC 
continues to grant the vast majority of renewal applications by radio and 
television broadcasters.148  This enforcement laxity, however, stands in 
sharp contrast to FCC Chairman Newton Minow’s threat to broadcasters 
in 1961 of more regulatory enforcement if they did not act to counter the 
“vast wasteland” of television—and Chairman Minow’s warning 
occurred when the Commission’s activity was near its peak.149  Indeed, a 
glance back at the television standards promulgated by the FCC in 1960 
shows just how poorly the Commission has been in maintaining its once-
minimum expectations of television quality.150  The initial FCC rules and 
guidelines were also designed to suppress music that glorified drug use, 
to suppress dirty words and discussions of sex, to limit commercials, and 
to increase educational programming that children should watch.151
 146. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
 147. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, 81–88 
(1993); Adelman,  supra note 37, at 1163. 
 148. Yoo, supra note 40, at 258. 
 149. Newton N. Minow, Address to the National Association of Broadcasters, May 
9, 1961, in NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: 
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 185, 185–96 (1995). 
 150. There was a time when the FCC gave precise guidelines to broadcasters about 
their public interest obligations.  The most detailed were contained in the En Banc 
Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).  In this statement, the FCC identified a 
list of program categories that it considered to be part of a balanced portfolio of 
programming, including: (1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development 
and use of local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational 
programs, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political 
broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10) news programs, etc.  Id. at 2314.  But this list 
now seems largely irrelevant.  The FCC no longer requires from licensees, as it once did, 
a detailed specification of program types and the amount of time devoted to each, 
although children’s programming continues to be regulated pursuant to Congress’s 
mandate in the Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996. 
 151. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 61–136 (1994). 




The reluctance of the FCC to take action is illustrated by one listener’s 
relentless crusade.  In 1999, David Smith began complaining to the 
Commission about the indecency of a Chicago drive-time radio show, 
“Mancow’s Morning Madhouse.”152  Over the next five years, Mr. Smith 
filed more than seventy complaints.153  Each time, the FCC dismissed 
the complaint, stating that Mr. Smith had not provided sufficient detail.  
Smith eventually went to the expense of providing the Commission with 
a transcript of the entire show in which indecent segments were aired.154  
Finally, the FCC took action, sanctioning the radio station for a program 
featuring an adult-film entertainer describing graphic sexual techniques, 
and another one called “B___ Radio,” in which women talked about 
sexual activities to the accompaniment of moaning.155
But if the FCC has not been successful in preventing broadcast 
indecency, neither have the courts been successful in enforcing 
obscenity laws.  Despite the Court’s opinion in Miller v. California, 
which expanded the reach of governmental regulation of obscenity to 
include materials offensive to the moral standards of the local rather than 
national community,156 “pornography grew like weeds in a vacant 
lot.”157  Eventually, obscenity cases stopped coming to the courts, partly 
because government agencies abandoned any censorship efforts, and 
partly because local censorship attempts were “easily evaded by national 
channels of communication such as mail service, telephone, and the 
[I]nternet.”158
Coinciding with this lax regulatory approach has been a steady decline 
in the broadcast industry’s efforts at self-regulation.159  Sexual content 
 152. Sarah McBride, One Man’s Campaign to Rid Radio of Smut is Finally Paying 
Off, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2004, at A1, A8. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30–34 (1973). 
 157. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2346 (2002). 
 158. Id.  The notion of community, as used in Miller, implies the existence of 
commonly held morals or ethics or cultural values, and that these commonly held beliefs 
are tied to a geographic location.  See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–34.  However, tightly-knit 
communities of people holding similar values and beliefs are no longer a characteristic of 
modern-day America.  Given the mobility of persons and families, as well as the relative 
isolation of people within defined geographic boundaries, the concept of “community 
standard” is a difficult concept to apply.  Community does not mean what it did when 
Miller was decided.  Now, people may live in one community, work in another, go 
shopping and recreate in a third community, and educate their children in yet another. 
 159. Many critics have predicted, and concluded, that if broadcasters were left to 
their own discretion, they would pander to the lowest common denominator, decreasing 
the quality of important information while simultaneously increasing commercialization.  
See Public Interest in Broadcasting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and 
Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 117–18, 120 (1991) 
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and graphic violence and vulgar language are more prevalent than ever 
before, and the vast majority of “reality television shows” are sliding 
down to the Jerry Springer level—shows that pay homage to the trinity 
of sexual shock, defiance and an “in-your-face” attitude.  After years of 
agreeing not to air liquor advertisements, for instance, broadcast television 
has not only begun airing them, but has laced those advertisements with 
raw sexual appeal, such as two women mud wrestling in their underwear.160  
Broadcasters are also showing no willingness to self-regulate the 
advertisement of sexual-aid products, such as impotency drugs, thus 
forcing parents to discuss with children topics perhaps considered 
inappropriate.  Finally, with respect to the V-chip, the television industry 
is proving to be anything but cooperative.  Despite demands from parent 
groups, the industry has refused to adopt a ratings system that would 
expressly identify the amount of sex, violence, and vulgar language in 
each program.161  Children’s advocacy groups oppose the current “age-
appropriateness” rating system as ineffective, because it does not 
provide parents with enough information.162  Such a system, however, is 
more attractive to broadcasters, who do not then have to focus on any 
one aspect of a program’s content but only have to make a general 
statement about the program.163  The V-chip is typically not even 
mentioned in operating manuals for televisions that contain the chip.164  
Consequently, parents rarely use the V-chip.165
The failure to self-regulate is not confined to television.  Video game 
makers likewise have a self-imposed ratings system,166 yet studies have 
(statement of Tracy Westen, Assistant Professor, Annenberg School for Communication).  
Despite presidential calls for the electronic media to regulate itself, PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. 
CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE 18 (1997), the Federal Trade Commission has reported that such self-regulation 
has not been successful.  See, e.g., FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 41 
(June 1998); see also Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 711, 717–19 (1999) (discussing the criticisms of media self-regulation). 
 160. For a discussion of these commercials, see Michael McCarthy, Miller Lite’s 
“Catfight” Ad Angers Some Viewers, at http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising 
2003-01-14-beer_x.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2003). 
 161. Lawrie Mifflin, Groups Gearing Up to Fight for More Precise TV Ratings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1996, at A1. 
 162. Id.; see also Mifflin, supra note 119. 
 163. Wasserman, supra note 119, at 1227. 
 164. Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611, 666 (2002) (reviewing CASS 
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Rupal Ruparel Dalal, Congress Shall Make No Law Abridging Freedom of 
Speech—Even If It Causes Our Children to Kill?, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 357, 368 (2001). 




shown that these manufacturers actively market toward children ultra-
violent games rated for users seventeen years and older.167  The Federal 
Trade Commission has found that the music industry’s rating system 
fails to provide enough information for parents to make intelligent 
decisions pertaining to which music their children listen.168  Moreover, 
in addition to the recording industry’s “basically useless” labeling 
system, there was also an alarming absence of enforcement of these 
ratings at the retail level.169
The movie industry has shown similar disregard for ratings.  Even 
though the majority of filmgoers are children, Hollywood has turned out 
more than five times as many R-rated films as G, PG, or PG-13 films 
since the year 2000.170  Whereas 2146 films have received R ratings, 
only 137 films have been rated G and 252 rated PG.171  Furthermore, the 
movie industry has been steadily growing more lenient in its ratings, 
allowing “increasingly more extreme content in any given age-based 
rating category over time.”172  A study by the Harvard School of Public 
Health has found that a decade of “ratings creep” has permitted more 
violent and sexually explicit content into films.173  In addition, according 
to the study, “[a]ge-based ratings alone do not provide good information 
about the depiction of violence, sex, profanity and other content.”174  
And if those increasingly lenient and ineffective ratings are not enough, 
theater chains have recently begun selling “R-cards,” which allow 
teenagers to attend R-rated movies without being accompanied by a 
parent or guardian.  Critics denounce these R-cards as yet another 
“maneuver around the movie rating system.”175
 167. Id. at 367. 
 168. FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF SELF-
REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & 
ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES 27 (Sept. 2000). 
 169. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transp. Comm., Marketing Violent Entertainment 
to Children: A Review of Self-Regulation and Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, 
Music Recording & Electronic Game Industries, FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 13, 2000, at 3.  
The FTC conducted a “secret shopper” survey which showed that children were 
successful in purchasing music label recordings 85% of the time.  Id. 
 170. Philip F. Anschutz, Whatever Happened to the Family Film?, 33 IMPRIMIS 1 
(June 2004), available at www.hillsdale.edu/newimprimis/2004/june/default.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2005). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Sharon Waxman, Study Finds Film Ratings Are Growing More Lenient, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 14, 2004, at E1. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  The Harvard study is available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/ 
480900. 
 175. Micheline Maynard, Youth Who Like Films Rated R, But Not Chaperones, Get 
a Card, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2004, at B7. 
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IX.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF CENSORSHIP 
The United States did not banish censorship with the ratification of the 
First Amendment.  Nongovernmental censorship continued to thrive, just 
as it had prior to adoption of the Bill of Rights.  Cultural codes strictly 
regulated the expressive behavior of late-eighteenth century Americans.  
Religion and social customs discouraged speech that was rude, 
offensive, degrading, or insulting.  But the law played a relatively minor 
role—the great majority of the censorship was culturally imposed. 
The influence of social shame also served to regulate public speech.176  
This shame was particularly effective given the small size and isolation 
of local communities, the intimacy of individuals living in those 
communities, the fear of being ostracized by the community, and the 
strict adherence to parental and social authority.177  As Professor Leonard 
Levy observes, eighteenth-century Americans did not consider freedom 
of speech to include the expression of “obnoxious or detestable ideas.”178
According to free speech theories prevailing at the time, the First 
Amendment was not aimed at maximizing the amount of public speech.  
To the contrary, the types of expression qualifying for protection were 
limited.  Levy argues that the framers of the First Amendment generally 
adhered to the philosophy of William Blackstone concerning free 
speech.179  Under the Blackstonian theory, speech that was defamatory, 
immoral, subversive, or disturbing of public peace and good order 
should not be protected.180  The liberty of speech, like practically every 
other liberty, was subject to the common good and bounded by the rights 
of others.181  “For Blackstone, the function of society was not merely to 
 176. Phaedra Athena O’Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis 
of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation 
Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 804–05 (1999). 
 177. Id. at 805. 
 178. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON xxix (Leonard W. Levy 
ed., 1966). 
 179. Id. at liv. 
 180. 5 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151–
53 (St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1803). 
 181. 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125 
(St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1803); Heyman, supra note 121, at 
569.  Under eighteenth-century notions of natural law, freedom of speech existed only as 
long as it was not used to injure or control the rights of another.  1 John Trenchard & 
Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same is Inseparable from Publick 
Liberty, LONDON J., Feb. 4, 1720, reprinted in 1 CATO’S LETTERS NO. 15, at 110 (Ronald 
Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995). 




protect natural rights but also to civilize human beings,”182 as morality 
and public order were the only solid foundations of civil liberty.183
Eighteenth-century Americans adhered to a kind of “morality of 
language,” recognizing the link between words and social relationships.184  
This morality of language encompassed a belief in civility.  It dictated 
that people should not engage in speech that insults or offends another 
person.185  As one eighteenth-century American writer opined, freedom 
of speech should be confined to the limits set by truthfulness, good taste, 
and “what is not against Morals or Good Manners.”186  According to 
Joseph Story, perhaps the foremost nineteenth-century constitutional 
historian, the claim that the First Amendment “was intended to secure to 
every citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or print, whatever he 
might please, without any responsibility, public or private, therefor [sic], 
is a supposition too wild to be indulged by any rational man.”187
Since the settlement of America’s first colonies, and persisting until 
the latter half of the twentieth century, the censorship of morally 
offensive speech was a consistent occurrence.188  During the colonial 
period, authorities regulated speech so as to maintain a moral society.189  
But even after ratifying the Bill of Rights, most states had statutes 
banning blasphemy and profanity.190  The first obscenity conviction 
occurred in the United States in 1815.  In Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 
the court ruled that the for-profit showing of a picture of a man and 
woman in an “indecent posture” constituted a common law offense 
against public decency.191  Six years later, Vermont enacted the first law 
making sexual obscenity a crime distinct from religious and political 
libel.192  And in 1873, Congress passed an anti-obscenity law known as 
the Comstock Act.193  Thus, when profanity became a constitutional 
 182. Heyman, supra note 123, at 1285. 
 183. Id. at 1287.  And in this regard, eighteenth-century Americans were in 
agreement with Blackstone.  Id. at 1288.  Even Thomas Jefferson agreed with this 
Blackstonian view that free speech was limited by the rights of others.  Id. at 1291. 
 184. Debora Shuger, Civility and Censorship in Early Modern England, in 
CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING 89, 98 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998). 
 185. See id. 
 186. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 115 (1960). 
 187. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1874, at 731–32 (DaCapo Press 1970) (1833). 
 188. H. Franklin Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, The Law of Obscenity—or 
Absurdity? 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 517, 520 (2003). 
 189. LARRY D. ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT HERITAGE: THE GROWTH OF FREE SPEECH IN 
EARLY AMERICA 9 (1994). 
 190. Robbins & Mason, supra note 188, at 540. 
 191. Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 101 (Pa. 1815). 
 192. 1821 Vt. Acts & Resolves, Ch. 1, § 23. 
 193. Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873). 
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right in Cohen v. California194 and indecency became fully protected by 
the First Amendment, they became rights “without any tradition behind 
[them],” leaving us with “no norms to govern [their] use.”195
Contrary to current First Amendment doctrines, the focus of free 
speech theories during the constitutional period was not exclusively on 
the speaker.  As much focus was placed on the harms caused by speech 
as on the benefits secured by free speech. But over time, the harms 
caused by unfettered speech became constitutionally demoted, eventually 
being characterized as mere social interests.196  Thus, when First Amendment 
conflicts now arise between speakers and unwilling listeners, it is the 
latter who lose out because they can only assert a “social interest” against 
a constitutional right.  Furthermore, contemporary free speech doctrines 
have generally abandoned the natural rights foundation of the First 
Amendment, in which free speech was limited by the rights of others.197  
This eighteenth-century natural law principle gave way in the twentieth 
century to the marketplace model, in which exclusive focus was placed 
on the speaker and all the possible benefits of speech, rather than on any 
harms of that speech to listeners. 
Because of the nature of public communications in the eighteenth 
century, listeners did not have to worry about averting their eyes from 
offensive speech.  Not only was such speech effectively constrained by 
private and cultural censorship practices, but the public communications 
system was not even remotely as pervasive as today.  There were only 
two forms of media: the newspaper, and the public lecturn.  If someone 
wished to read a newspaper, they had to go out and find one.  It was not 
delivered to their doorstep.  If someone wanted to hear a public lecture 
or debate, they had to walk to the town hall, early enough to secure a 
seat.  They knew ahead of time the general content of what they were 
about to read or listen to, and they had to take very deliberate and 
strenuous efforts to receive that information.  Later, as the mass media 
began to evolve in the late nineteenth century, listeners were still able to 
avoid an “averting their eyes” problem.  For during the Victorian era, it 
was still considered taboo to engage in any kind of crude or offensive 
expression.198
 194. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 195. STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY 69 (1998). 
 196. Heyman, supra note 123, at 1306. 
 197. Id. at 1299. 
 198. CARTER, supra note 195, at 138. 




Early Americans also seemed to have drawn a distinction between 
political speech and offensive, nonpolitical speech.  Many eighteenth-
century state laws specifically prohibited profanity, blasphemy, and 
lewdness.199  Moreover, state licensing laws censored entertainment, even 
though a similar censorship of the press was considered unconstitutional.  
Laws regulating stage performances and theatrical productions were 
even passed by the Continental Congress.200  And throughout the 
nineteenth century, state regulators continued to monitor the theater.201  
As one scholar has noted, “[w]hatever the First Amendment meant to 
Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, or Story, it did not have sufficient reach 
to bar the . . . [censorship] of theatrical presentations.”202
X.  JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF AUDIENCE RIGHTS                                           
OVER SPEAKER RIGHTS 
If a free communicative process is at the heart of the First Amendment, 
then listener protections should apply equally in public as well as in the 
home, especially because in a media-filled world, the boundaries of 
“home” are less important and less definable than they once were. 
One area of case law in which the courts have given precedence to 
listener rights in connection with public speech has involved the 
regulation of offensive art confronting an unsuspecting viewer.  In Close v. 
Lederle,203 for instance, the court found that a display of sexually explicit 
paintings in the corridor of a university’s student union amounted to an 
“assault upon individual privacy.”  A similar finding in another case justified 
the relocation of a prominent display of “sexually explicit and racially 
insulting art.”204  Likewise, a “vulgar, shocking and tasteless painting” was 
removed on the grounds that it “was displayed in the direct line of vision of 
everyone who entered the Federal Courthouse.”205  Yet even aside from 
vulgarity and offensiveness, courts have upheld listener rights in the 
removal or diminishment of speech that overclutters the public domain.206
 199. ELDRIDGE, supra note 189, at 6. 
 200. Jon M. Garon, Entertainment Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 559, 633–35 (2002). 
 201. Id. at 634. 
 202. Id. at 635. 
 203. 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir. 1970). 
 204. Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 205. Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff’d, 28 
F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 206. In Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), 
the Court found that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public 
property was not unconstitutional even as applied to political campaign speech.  Id. at 
796–807.  While acknowledging that the ordinance diminished the total quantity of 
speech, the Court ruled that it was justified by the city’s interest in maintaining the 
aesthetic appeal of the community.  Id. at 805. 
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Perhaps the most prominent example of listener-based restrictions on 
speech directed to a mass audience involves FCC regulations on 
indecent broadcast programming.207  In Pacifica, the Court upheld FCC 
rules restricting the broadcast of indecent material to hours when 
children would less likely be in the audience.208  The justifications for 
this ruling were two-fold.209  First, the regulations were necessary 
because of the pervasive presence of broadcast media in American 
life.210  Relying on the captive audience doctrine, the Court stated that 
indecent broadcast material confronts the individual in the privacy of her 
own home, where the right “to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.”211  Second, the Court found that 
broadcasting “is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to 
read.”212  Thus, channeling indecent material into hours when children 
were unlikely to be listening was the only effective way of shielding 
children from such material. 
Stressing the need to preserve the home as a sanctuary, safe from 
unwanted speech or images, the Pacifica Court compared the broadcast 
audience to the home-dwellers in Kovacs who were unable to escape the 
loudspeaker intrusion.213  Consequently, like the Kovacs home-dwellers, 
broadcast listeners and viewers also needed some government 
protection, as they could tune into the middle of a program and without 
warning be exposed to offensive, indecent speech.214  In Pacifica, the 
Court held that the rights of the public to avoid unwanted speech trump 
those of the broadcaster to disseminate such speech.215  The Court found 
unpersuasive the argument that the offended listener or viewer could 
quite simply turn the dial and tune out the unwanted broadcast, 
reasoning that because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and 
out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from 
unexpected program content.216
 207. Similar to the speech in Kovacs, television programming constitutes speech 
emanating from a single source and directed to a large audience of listeners.  See supra 
note 101. 
 208. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–51 (1978). 
 209. Id. at 748. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)). 
 212. Id. at 749. 
 213. Id at 748–49. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 




Prior to Pacifica, the Supreme Court had stated that it is “the right of 
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is 
paramount.”217  This focus on listeners, in contrast to the marketplace 
model’s exclusively speaker-centered view of the First Amendment, also 
appeared in Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion in Denver Area, which 
involved a challenge to a federal statute restricting the transmission of 
indecent speech on cable television.218  Justice Breyer stated that the 
Pacifica rationales—pervasiveness, invasion of the home, ineffectiveness of 
warnings, accessibility to children—applied with equal force to cable 
television, thus justifying a less protective level of scrutiny than that 
typically associated with content-based regulation.219  In terms of 
intrusiveness and pervasiveness, Breyer found little difference between 
cable and broadcast television.220  Justice Breyer even implied that 
Pacifica might extend to all media, noting that the question of whether 
“Pacifica does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of review 
where indecent speech is at issue” is still open.221
To this day, Pacifica’s recognition of the power and intrusiveness of 
television (and by extension—the Internet) still rings true.222  Due to 
their “uniquely pervasive presence,” patently offensive broadcasts 
“confront[] the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the 
home . . . .”223  In a later case, the Court likewise applied this pervasiveness 
factor to cable, which in turn rendered cable more susceptible to 
regulation.224  In addition to the “pervasive” nature of cable, another 
factor which justified compromising cable operators’ speech interests to 
further those of listeners was the economic power of cable operators, 
who face “little competition” and can constitute “a kind of bottleneck 
that controls the range of viewer choice.”225
Reflecting the Pacifica approach, the D.C. Circuit in Action for 
Children’s Television v. FCC upheld the safe harbor provisions of the 
 217. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
 218. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732 (1996). 
 219. Id. at 744–45. 
 220. Id. at 744, 748. 
 221. Id. at 755. 
 222. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994), aff’d, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).  Even in 
Sable Communications v. FCC, which struck down a ban on dial-a-porn telephone 
messages, the Court recognized that broadcasting “can intrude on the privacy of the 
home without prior warning as to program content, and is ‘uniquely accessible to 
children, even those too young to read.’”  492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (quoting FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978)). 
 223. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
 224. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195–215.  Justice Breyer, in evaluating the regulations, 
recognized that occasionally some speech has to be restricted in order to further other 
speech and that only a reasonable balance had to be achieved between the speech-
restricting and speech-enhancing elements.  Id. at 227–28 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 
 225. Id. at 227–28 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 
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Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 permitting indecent broadcasts 
only between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.226  In its ruling, the court recognized that 
the prevalence of televisions rendered real parental control impossible.227  
The court also found that those parents who wished to expose their 
children to indecent programming would “have no difficulty in doing so 
through the use of subscription and pay-per-view cable channels, 
delayed-access viewing using VCR equipment, and the rental or 
purchase of readily available audio and video cassettes.”228  The court 
then concluded that the time-channeling rule for indecent broadcasts did 
not “unnecessarily interfere with the ability of adults to watch or listen 
to such materials both because [adults] are active after midnight and . . . 
have so many alternative ways of satisfying their tastes at other 
times.”229
Even more importantly, nothing can prevent children from watching 
television at the homes of their friends, whose parents may allow 
uncontrolled viewing.  Moreover, technologically-challenged parents 
may have difficulty programming the V-chip and hence may shy away 
from using it entirely.  Technologically sophisticated children, on the 
other hand, may be able to crack the system.  But the safe harbor rules 
would prevent children from watching indecent programming anywhere 
and anytime during a good part of the day.  While such rules would greatly 
assist parents in controlling the media input their children receive, they 
would impose a mere inconvenience on adults desiring to access indecent 
programming.230  Furthermore, safe harbor regulations are consistent with the 
ruling in Crawford v. Lungren, where the court upheld a statute 
restricting the ways in which sexually-oriented print material could be 
distributed, so as to prevent exposure of it to minors.231  The court found 
no constitutional violation with a statute banning the sale of “harmful 
material” from unsupervised sidewalk vending machines.232
Some courts have given increased importance to listener rights 
 226. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (en banc). 
 227. Id. at 661. 
 228. Id. at 663. 
 229. Id. at 667.  The decision, however, only applied to broadcast television, not to 
cable. 
 230. Id. at 659–67. 
 231. Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 232. Id. at 385–89. 




regarding certain new technologies.233  Both the Second and Ninth Circuits 
have sustained restrictions on access to dial-a-porn services, finding that 
such restrictions were necessary to protect the children of parents who 
did not wish them to hear this particular kind of speech.234  These 
restrictions—e.g., requiring telephone companies to block all access to 
dial-a-porn services unless telephone subscribers submit written requests 
to unblock them—were enacted in response to an earlier Supreme Court 
decision striking down a complete ban on dial-a-porn services.235  Thus, 
an important factor leading the courts in Dial Information Services  and 
Information Providers’ Coalition to rule as they did was the fact that the 
restrictions did not amount to a complete ban on the indecent speech, but 
merely shifted the burdens of accessing such speech. 
In Bland v. Fessler,236 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 
restriction on telemarketers’ use of automatic dialing and announcing 
devices (ADADs).  It ruled that ADADs were much more disruptive 
than door-to-door solicitors, and “‘more of a nuisance and a greater 
invasion of privacy’ than telemarketing with live operators . . . .”237  The 
court then held that the regulation at issue did not amount to an absolute 
ban on speech, because the use of ADADs were permitted so long as the 
called party consented to the message238 (although it is difficult to 
imagine that many people would ever so consent).  The court also found 
that a do-not call list was not a less restrictive means of accomplishing 
the government’s objective because such a list would place the burden 
on the public to stop disruptive ADAD calls from arriving at their 
 233. As the Supreme Court once observed, because of “constantly proliferating new 
and ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are inescapably captive audiences for many 
purposes.’”  Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (quoting 
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).  Communications 
technologies are continually exposing people to new kinds of unwanted speech.  Sitting 
in the computer section of the library, a person can glance around and see the screen of 
someone else as they view a sexually graphic web site.  Television programs prohibited 
by parents are graphically advertised during other programs.  Huge video screens run day 
and night in public places.  Internet terminals are waiting and ready in coffee houses and 
even fast-food restaurants. 
 234. In Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh and Information Providers’ 
Coalition v. FCC, the Second and Ninth Circuits ruled that the restrictions in the so-
called “Helms Amendment,” 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(b) and (c), did not violate the First 
Amendment.  Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1536–40 (2d Cir. 
1991); Info. Providers’ Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 868, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 235. Sable Comms. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989). 
 236. 88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996).  The case involved a challenge to a California law 
regulating automatic dialing and announcing devices.  The law prohibited the use of the 
devices unless a live operator first identified the calling party and obtained the called 
party’s consent to listen to the prerecorded message.  Id. at 731. 
 237. Id. at 733. 
 238. Id. 
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homes.239  Nor did the court accept the argument that people should be 
left to themselves to combat ADADs, by turning off their ringers or 
screening their calls or simply hanging up on the prerecorded calls.240  In 
other words, the court did not impose an “averting one’s eye’s” burden 
on the recipients of the calls; it did not place the entire burden on the 
recipient to opt-out. 
XI.  THE ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS DEFENSE 
In today’s society, speech portraying sex, violence and vulgarity is in 
great supply.  Not only is it in abundant supply, but it is accessible to the 
point of being unavoidable.  As Justice Powell noted nearly three 
decades ago in his Pacifica concurrence: “I doubt whether today’s 
decision will prevent any adult who wishes to receive Carlin’s message 
in Carlin’s own words from doing so . . . .”241  Indeed, as the Court 
observed, if an adult wished to hear vulgarity-laced humor, they could 
do so through tapes, records, nightclubs, and late-night broadcasts.242
Pacifica suggests that any restrictions on speech should be viewed in 
light of the total supply or expression of that speech through the entire 
media, not just through the one medium being subjected to restriction.  
For instance, if sexually graphic songs are restricted from broadcast 
radio, they are still available though CDs, music videos, special 
television channels, and live concerts.  There has been no ban on such 
songs, just a re-channeling of them in a way that facilitates the rights of 
unwilling listeners.  Likewise, a family hour requirement regarding 
television programming would still leave open a host of other 
entertainment options for adults, who “have so many alternative ways of 
satisfying their tastes at other times.”243  Because of the proliferation of 
so many different communications mediums, censorship should be 
viewed in terms of the whole spectrum of media.  Restriction of speech 
in one medium may be permissible if that speech remains accessible 
through other mediums. 
 239. Id. at 736. 
 240. Id. 
 241. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 762 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).  
George Carlin was the “satiric humorist” whose recorded 12 minute monologue entitled 
“Filthy Words” was broadcast in the afternoon by Pacifica, a New York radio station.  
Id. at 729–30. 
 242. Id. at 750 n.28. 
 243. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc). 




Prior to the explosion of communications technologies, the censorship 
of a particular medium (or of a particular way of conveying an idea or 
information) amounted more or less to a complete censorship of that 
idea or information.  But now, that is not the case.  Therefore, when 
addressing the restrictions placed on one kind of output or imagery of 
one medium, courts should look at the whole of the media society, to see 
if that one restriction is really an unconstitutional infringement on 
speech.  In a media society bulging with unlimited media content, courts 
should approach censorship issues as they do issues of statutory 
construction or interpretation—they should look at the whole scheme.  
They should examine whether the one particular restriction amounts to 
an effective censorship, in the society at large, of an idea or piece of 
information.244
When the First Amendment was ratified, there was essentially one 
medium for speech.  Therefore, it can be argued that a speaker only has a 
right to have his or her speech accessible in some medium(s), but not 
every medium.  To be free, speech does not have to be completely 
uninhibited in all venues or forums. 
Courts have implicitly approved this approach by upholding statutes 
that restrict speech in one venue while leaving open alternative channels 
of communications.245  In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, the 
court held that a statute restricting advertising in certain media did not 
violate the First Amendment, as advertising in other media was still 
available.246  In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld a “buffer zone” 
regulation restricting the speech rights of abortion protestors, finding 
that the only restricted avenue of communication was face-to-face 
dialogue and that the regulation left open ample alternative channels of 
communication.247  Similarly, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, the 
Court noted that although speakers had to keep a distance from their 
intended audience, they remained “free to espouse their message” in 
various ways from that greater distance.248  Through cases like Hill and 
 244. Courts can distinguish between laws that suppress ideas and laws that only 
suppress particular expressions of those ideas.  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 
(1971) (stating that the First Amendment has “never been thought to give absolute 
protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any 
form of address in any circumstances that he chooses”).  For instance, a lot of books and 
movies express violence—so do we really need a video game expression of the same 
thing (and in a way that has a particularly harmful effect on children)? 
 245. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); see also Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 
970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that a ban on auto-dialing machines still left abundant 
alternatives open to advertisers). 
 246. 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
 247. 530 U.S. 703, 726–27 (2000). 
 248. 519 U.S. 357, 385 (1997), cert. denied, Warren v. United States, 540 U.S. 881 
(2003).  The Court upheld a provision imposing a fixed fifteen-foot “buffer zone.”  Id. 
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Schenck, the Supreme Court seems to be saying that what is important is 
that the potential of communicative interchange be preserved between 
speakers and willing listeners.  Thus, speech restrictions are valid if 
willing listeners can still seek out and obtain the speech through an 
alternative channel.249
XII.  SOCIETY’S FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN THE UPBRINGING                      
OF CHILDREN 
In almost every case involving indecent speech, the courts address the 
most obvious purpose of any attempted restrictions on such speech: the 
protection of children.250  The courts have gone to great length to carve 
out special constitutional protections for children.251  But this concern 
with shielding minors from indecent speech often erodes when it comes 
in conflict with the speech rights of adults and the interests of the 
marketplace model.252  Few measures shielding minors from indecent 
speech are upheld if they have any restraining effect on the ability of 
adults to access such speech.253  Consequently, the child protection 
interest frequently loses out to the abundance goal, to the idea that any 
burden on speech is the equivalent of an unconstitutional infringement. 
Despite this advantage enjoyed by the marketplace model, however, 
 249. And in Urofsky v. Gilmore, where a group of university professors challenged 
the constitutionality of a statute restricting state employees from accessing sexually 
explicit material on computers owned by the state, the court noted that the statute did not 
prohibit all access to such materials, as an employee could always get permission from 
their agency head to access the material.  167 F.3d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 1999), adhered to, 
on reh’g, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 250. See infra note 251. 
 251. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (stating that the 
“prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government 
objective of surpassing importance); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 643 
(1968) (upholding state requirements that restricted the distribution of printed matter to 
children, whether or not the material would be obscene to adults); FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (noting that the government’s interest in the “well-
being of its youth” justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting); Prince v. 
Massachussets, 321 U.S. 158, 159–61, 164–71 (1944) (upholding a statute prohibiting 
the use of a child to distribute literature on the street, notwithstanding the statute’s effect 
on a First Amendment activity). 
 252. As Professor Shiffrin notes, “[c]hildren are the Achilles heel of liberal 
ideology.”  Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 647 (1980).  
They are “more impressionable and . . . constitute a captive audience.”  Id.  Therefore, it 
is understandable that the most difficult speech problems occur with children.  See id. 
 253. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (opining that child 
protection restrictions should not reduce adults to reading “only what is fit for children”). 




courts have recognized that society has a strong interest in enabling 
parents to raise their children according to their personal beliefs.  Courts, 
for instance, have upheld laws prohibiting the distribution of pornographic 
materials to children under a particular age,254 preventing children from 
obtaining abortions without parental notification,255 and precluding 
persons under a certain age from purchasing alcohol and cigarettes.256  
Because of the importance of the childrearing process, the Constitutional 
demands of free speech must be “applied with sensitivity . . . to the 
special needs of parents and children.”257  The Supreme Court has 
specifically ruled that government has an interest in facilitating parental 
control over what their children see and hear.258  This interest seeks to 
empower parents’ right to control the communications environment of 
their children and to direct their children’s education as they see fit.259
But in addition to this interest in empowering parental childrearing, 
the government possesses an independent interest in the mental and 
emotional development of children into mature citizens, regardless of the 
decisions made by their parents.260  As the Supreme Court has stated, a 
democratic government requires “the healthy, well-rounded growth of 
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”261  One way 
to achieve this maturation is to prevent childhood exposure to harmful 
speech and images.262  Consequently, where children are involved, freedoms 
of speech may have to be “balanced against the society’s countervailing 
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior.”263  This balancing, for instance, has justified the restriction of 
sexually graphic speech expressed during a high school assembly.264
The Court has ruled that speech protected by the First Amendment as 
to adults may not necessarily be protected as to children.  It upheld, in 
Ginsberg v. New York, a statute prohibiting the sale to minors of 
 254. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633. 
 255. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1309, 1314 (1994). 
 256. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211–12 (1987); State v. Trudell, 
No. 21620-5-II, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 671, at *1–2, 5 (Wash. Ct. App. May 1, 1998). 
 257. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 258. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978). 
 259. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
 260. See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in 
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 434–35 (2000). 
 261. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). 
 262. Heyman, supra note 121, at 609.  But the governmental interest in promoting 
the development of children into responsible citizens also includes the inculcation of 
certain civic values.  These values serve to mold character in ways that instill a sense of 
public duty and public good.  Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of 
Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 73 (1990). 
 263. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
 264. Id. at 677–86. 
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otherwise constitutionally protected pornography.265  The Court declared 
that the governmental interest in protecting the wellbeing of children is 
not limited to protecting them from physical and psychological harm, 
but also extends to protecting them from material that may impair their 
ethical and moral development.266  Even though the Ginsberg Court 
doubted the scientific certainty of the legislative conclusion that the 
material banned by the statute did in fact impair the ethical and moral 
development of children, it noted that such a link had not been disproved.267  
This same approach was taken in Action for Children’s Television v. 
FCC, where the court, in upholding broadcast decency regulations, 
stated, “[we have] never suggested that a scientific demonstration of 
psychological harm is required in order to establish the constitutionality 
of measures protecting minors from exposure to indecent speech.”268
Many parents and citizens strongly support the “efforts of Congress to 
protect children from harmful” and offensive entertainment speech.269  
According to congressional findings, the average child witnesses 
approximately 100,000 acts of violence on television by the time that 
child completes elementary school.270  There are many who believe that a 
community should have the authority to protect children from exposure 
to this kind of media output, and that the “widespread availability of 
such material in the larger society makes it virtually impossible for 
parents to act effectively on their own.”271  Yet many attempts to do so 
have been foiled by a seemingly one-sided application of the First 
Amendment that looks only to the interests of media speakers. 
 265. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 266. Id. at 641. 
 267. Id. at 641–42. 
 268. 58 F.3d 654, 661–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 269. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 217 F.3d 162 
(3d Cir. 2000).  For instance, best-selling music CDs include Grammy Award winner 
Alanis Morrisette lamenting the loss of her lover to another woman, asking “[w]ould she 
go down on you in a theater?” and Nine Inch Nails singing “you let me violate you, you 
let me desecrate you, you let me penetrate you . . . I want to [expletive] you like an animal.”  
ALANIS MORRISETTE, You Oughta Know, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick/Reprise 
Records 1995); NINE INCH NAILS, Closer, on THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL, (Interscope 
Records 1994). 
 270. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 139–
40.  The average child is exposed to twenty-five hours of television each week, and some 
are exposed to as much as eleven hours per day.  Id. at 139.  Given this barrage of media 
violence, perhaps it is not surprising that fourteen percent of all deaths of American 
children are the result of homicides.  145 CONG. REC. S5733 (1999). 
 271. Heyman, supra note 121, at 608. 




In addressing the problem of access to pornography on the Internet, 
Congress has tried on several occasions to construct doorways that will 
seal off sexually explicit material from children.  In 1996, it passed the 
Communications Decency Act, which prohibited the transmission over 
the Internet of indecent material to anyone under the age of eighteen.272  
This prohibition, however, was struck down by the Supreme Court as 
unconstitutional in Reno.273  Next, Congress passed the Child Online 
Protection Act (COPA).274  This statute forbade any person from using 
the World Wide Web to make “any communication for commercial 
purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material 
that is harmful to minors . . . .”275  But the Court struck down this law in 
Ashcroft v. ACLU.276  Then, with the Child Pornography and Prevention 
Act, Congress expanded the federal prohibition on child pornography to 
include computer-generated images of minors engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.277  Again, this law was overturned in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition.278
In Reno, the Court agreed that there is “‘a compelling interest in 
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors’ which 
extended to shielding them from indecent messages . . . .”279  However, 
as the Court has done on so many previous occasions, it downgraded this 
interest when it conflicted with the rights of adults to access, burden-
free, such messages.280
Naively holding to the marketplace model, the courts have denied 
efforts to regulate indecent speech accessible to children, relying on the 
principle that in seeking to protect youth the government cannot “reduce 
the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children.”281  But 
 272. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (2000). 
 273. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874–85 (1997) (holding that the Act’s provisions 
were unconstitutionally vague and burdensome to the First Amendment rights of adults). 
 274. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 1994). 
 275. Id. § 231(a)(1). 
 276. 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004). 
 277. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A)-(D) (2000). 
 278. 535 U.S. 234, 256–58 (2002). 
 279. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (quoting Sable Comms. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).  And this interest cannot be served simply by relying upon 
parental supervision.  See Nachbar, supra note 107, at 220–21.  As Professor Nachbar 
notes, “[v]ery few parents have the time to supervise all of the time that their children 
spend on the Internet.”  Id. at 220.  Nor is parental monitoring “a real alternative for 
families in which both parents must, or choose, to work, or for those headed by a single 
parent.”  Id.  Furthermore, “unless the parent were, for example, to open each [web] page 
with the child looking away and only allow the child to view the page after a parental 
preview, there is no way to keep the child from taking in the content while the parent is 
evaluating its appropriateness.”  Id. at 221. 
 280. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869–70. 
 281. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
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this ignores reality: that so much of the violent and sexually graphic 
speech today is aimed not at adults but at children.  Furthermore, by 
adhering so steadfastly to the marketplace model, courts often make a 
cursory rejection of the government’s proffered rationale for regulations 
infringing on the burden-free access to indecent speech.282
Ironically, the courts seem to be far more eager to repress 
nonentertainment forms of speech for the sake of protecting children.  In 
Bering v. SHARE, for instance, the Washington Supreme Court found 
that the state’s compelling interest in protecting children from disturbing 
speech justified an injunction limiting the speech of anti-abortion 
picketers.  This injunction applied to the use of words such as “‘murder’, 
‘kill’, and their derivatives” during demonstrations outside a medical 
building where abortions were performed.283
A greater focus on listener rights, as well as a stronger First 
Amendment recognition of the right of parents to control their family’s 
communicative environment, would greatly help society in protecting 
children from harmful speech.  As one court has admitted, “[i]t is 
fanciful to believe that the vast majority of parents who wish to shield 
their children from indecent material can effectively do so without 
meaningful restrictions on the airing of broadcast indecency.”284
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
What has been lost amidst the marketplace model of the First 
Amendment is the notion that censorship is the flipside of speech.  In 
terms of individual freedom, rejection is as important as expression; 
being forced to endure media entertainment that is vile and vulgar and 
violent can be just as repressive as being punished for voicing one’s 
political views.  Set in a time preceding America’s media explosion and 
the breakdown of any social constraints on public speech, current First 
Amendment doctrines are no longer applicable to disputes involving 
restrictions on the escalating amounts of indecent entertainment 
 282. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755–
56 (1996); AIDS Action Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 79, 81, 84 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (holding that the goal of shielding children from advertisements that used 
sexual innuendos in promoting condom use was not sufficiently compelling to justify the 
rejection of those advertisements in public transit spaces), modified by, aff’d, 42 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 1994). 
 283. Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 921 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). 
 284. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc). 
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programming.  Those doctrines are incapable of recognizing or protecting 
an individual’s or society’s desire for freedom from intrusive and 
offensive pornographic material. 
As reflected in the Court’s campaign-finance decision in McConnell v. 
FEC, constitutional doctrines are being adjusted to take into account the 
changed circumstances of modern life.  Ironically, however, those 
adjustments are taking place with respect to the most protected kind of 
speech—political speech.  Yet when it comes to the abundance and 
accessibility of online pornography, the Supreme Court has refused to 
re-think its free speech doctrines.  As demonstrated in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
the Court refuses to place any burdens in the path of individuals wishing 
to view pornography, even as it recognizes the harm that such material 
can cause to children. 
Given the nature of the modern world, the real infringement on 
individual freedom does not come from government repression of a right 
to speak but from an intrusive media that pushes offensive material into 
the lives of unwilling recipients.  Given the realities of the modern media, as 
well as the individual’s role in that world, the First Amendment should 
be interpreted to protect the freedom to reject harmful, degrading, 
nonpolitical speech.  Indeed, such a freedom is as vital to individual 
autonomy as is the freedom to speak; it may even be more important, 
especially because rejection is the only form of public speech available 
to most people in a mass-media-dominated society. 
Under the prevailing marketplace model of the First Amendment, no 
burdens are allowed on an adult’s access to speech, even if slight 
burdens are needed to protect children from exposure to violent or 
pornographic material.  Under the marketplace model, the placement of 
burdens is greatly skewed toward the unwilling recipient of offensive 
speech.  While this approach may have been proper during a time when 
indecent entertainment was neither so pervasive nor intrusive, it is no 
longer applicable to the most pressing issues concerning communicative 
freedoms in the modern world.  Instead, a new First Amendment model 
is needed that recognizes the rights of the unwilling recipients of media 
entertainment, and that better balances the burdens of adults wishing to 
access indecent speech with the burdens of those wishing to avoid it. 
In contrast to eighteenth-century America, there are now many different 
kinds of media and many different ways for individuals to gain access to 
speech.  Thus, a burden placed on one form of media or on one avenue 
for accessing speech still leaves plenty of other unburdened sources of 
that speech.  Given the historical and philosophical foundations of free 
speech, it seems a perversion of the First Amendment to interpret it in a 
way that states that any obstacle or inconvenience imposed on just one 
media venue of pornographic speech amounts to a constitutional violation. 
